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Abstract 
Offshore oil and gas platforms are well known for their compact 
geometry, high degree of congestion, limited ventilation and difficult escape 
routes. A small mishap under such conditions can quickly escalate into a 
catastrophe. Among all the loss producing events occurring offshore, fires and 
explosions are the most frequently reported process related accidents. They have 
potential to cause serious injury to personnel, major damage to equipment and 
structure, and disruption of operations. It is therefore necessary to study the 
characteristics of fires and explosions and thereby quantify the 
hazards I consequences posed by them In order to complete a detailed 
quantitative risk assessment study. This can eventually form a basis for the 
implementation of appropriate mitigation measures and emergency response 
plans to protect personnel in case of any eventuality. 
While there are many consequence models available to predict fire and 
explosion hazards -varying from simple empirical models to highly complex 
computational fluid dynamic models - only a few have been validated for the 
unique conditions found offshore. Furthermore, the complexity involved In 
simulating these models for quantifying the consequences makes the use of 
computer programs inevitable. Although, there are a few commercial software 
11 
packages available for offshore quantitative risk assessment and consequence 
studies, they are very expensive and there is ample scope for technical 
improvements in these packages. 
This work is, therefore, focused on developing a scientifically sound tool 
for offshore consequence analysis. Technical improvements were incorporated by 
carrying out an extensive literature review on the existing consequence models 
(such as source models, dispersion models, ignition models, and fire and 
explosion models) and selecting the state-of-the-art ones most suitable for 
offshore conditions. Also, the implementation of a grid based methodology for 
impact assessment is innovative and is the highlight of this work. This work is 
considered to have produced a significant contribution in the areas of fire and 
explosion consequence modeling due to the development of additional models 
for predicting fire overpressures and analyzing the possibility of accident 
escalation (Domino effects analysis). 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OFFSHORE PROCESS OPERATIONS 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
An offshore oil and gas platform is usually divided into a number of 
modules for operations, such as separation, water injection, high-pressure 
compression, and seawater de-aeration, as well as local and main electrical 
rooms and an accommodations block. Most of the process modules are highly 
congested with the presence of obstacles in the form of pipelines, barriers and 
other equipment necessary for process operations. The level of risk in such 
conditions, while operating in a remote and harsh marine environment, is high. 
A study by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1996 and Mansfield 
et al., 1996a) showed that process and structural failure incidents account for 
almost 80°/o of the risk to personnel offshore. Potential risks offshore include 
blowouts, riser and process leaks, fires, explosions, vessel collisions, helicopter 
accidents, dropped objects, structural failures, and capsizing. The past few 
1 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
decades have seen a wide range of major accidents with a number of fatalities, 
economic losses, and damage to the environment. Examples of accidents in the 
offshore oil and gas industry includes the flooding and capsize of the Ocean 
Ranger on the Grand Banks (1982), a blowout on the Vinland off Sable Island 
(1984), the structural failure and loss of the Alexander Kielland in Norway (1980), 
the process leak leading to fires and explosions on the Piper Alpha in the UK 
(1988), the explosion and sinking of the P-36 production semi-submersible off 
Brazil (2001), and the recent helicopter accident en route to the Bombay High 
offshore platform. An examination of incidents such as Piper Alpha in the North 
Sea and the P-36 production semi-submersible off Brazil reveals that most 
offshore incidents are in fact process-related. 
Experience shows that operational failures and human errors are the most 
common initiating events for accidents offshore. While operational failures could 
be arrested by safety-instrumented systems (through monitoring and restriction 
to the desirable limits of Safety Integrity Level or SIL), human errors are difficult 
to identify and quantify. Recently DiMattia et al. (2004) developed a unique 
human error probability calculation index for offshore mustering. The 
operational failures can be mainly attributed to design faults or improper 
inspection and maintenance. 
2 
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1.2. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
An offshore development can never be completely safe, but the degree of 
inherent safety (Mansfield et al., 1996b and Khan & Amyotte, 2002) can be 
increased by selecting the optimum design in terms of the installation/ field 
configuration, layout, and operation. This is done in an attempt to reduce the risk 
to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) without resorting to 
costly protective systems. This requires the identification and assessment of 
major risk contributors, which could be accomplished using Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (QRA) techniques early in the project life cycle. If a structured 
approach of identification and assessment is not carried out early in the project, it 
is possible that the engineering judgment approach will fail to identify all of the 
major risks, and that loss prevention expenditures will be targeted in areas where 
there is little benefit. This may result in expensive remedial actions later during 
the life of the project (Vinnem, 1998). 
QRA involves four main steps (Figure 1.1): hazard identification, 
consequence assessment, probability calculation, and risk quantification (Khan et 
al., 2002). Consequence assessment, which is central to QRA, involves 
quantification of the likely loss or damage due to anticipated eventualities. 
Among the various possible loss-producing events on offshore production 
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facilities, fires and explosions are the most frequently reported process-related 
incident (Chamberlain, 2002). They may result in anything from no damage or 
loss, up to catastrophic damage or loss, depending upon their characteristics. 
START 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Hazard assessment 
Failure case selection 
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
Consequences/ln1pacts of 
each failure case 
FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
Likelihood of each failure 
case 
Focus of the 
present study 
RISK ESTIMATION 
END 
Select safety measures to 
mitigate Riskf apply them 
and re-evaluate risk 
Figure 1.1. Flow chart for Quantitative Risk Assessment 
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Since the Piper Alpha disaster, the offshore industry has carried out a great 
deal of research work directed towards understanding the characteristics of 
hydrocarbon fires and explosions. This research has resulted in the development 
of numerous fire and explosion consequence models varying from simple 
empirical models to highly complex computational fluid dynamics models. The 
complexity involved in using these models for quantification of consequences 
has led to the evolution of computer-automated toolkits. There are many 
commercial software packages available for a detailed analysis of fire and 
explosion consequences, which includes COMEX, VENTEX, CLICHE, FRED, 
SCOPE, ARAMAS, FIREX, MAXCRED, PLATO, DAMAGE, OHRAT, PHAST, 
SAFETI, SUPERCHEMS, and CANARY etc. These packages use empirical, semi-
empirical and phenomenological models for analyzing the characteristics of 
accidents. The advantage of using simple models is less computational time, thus 
aiding the design engineers to carry out numerous "what if' runs, and testing the 
effect of design modifications. It also aids in conducting a detailed quantitative 
risk assessment study in less time. Complex computer models (mainly based on 
computational fluid dynamics) such as FLACS, EXSIM, COBRA, CFX, 
AUTOREAGAS, Imperial College code etc. are also available. However, the 
limiting factors in their applicability are related to high computational time and 
user expertise. Further, the input details required by models are very high, thus 
being inappropriate for use in the early design phase. 
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Although, the above mentioned packages serve the purpose of performing 
a QRA and consequence analysis, only a few deal with offshore process 
operations. The ones that consider offshore conditions are very expensive, for 
example, OHRAT (offshore hazard and risk analysis tool kit), now known as 
NEPTUNE supplied by DNV costs more than $100,000. Further, there is ample 
scope of technical improvements in these commercial software packages. Thus, 
there is a need for an economically viable, easy to use, scientifically sound tool 
for offshore QRA, particularly consequence assessment. The present work is an 
attempt to fulfill these requirements. 
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE CURRENT WORK 
The overall objective of this work is nTo develop an integrated computer 
automated toolkit for Consequence Analysis of process accidents on offshore 
oil and gas platforms". 
In the process of achieving this objective, the work has been planned in 
such a way that the existing knowledge of Offshore Consequence Analysis can 
be enhanced through the following advancements: 
• Release, Dispersion and Ignition modeling: Available release models 
and gas dispersion models have been reviewed and the models most 
6 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
suitable to conditions offshore have been identified. An enhanced model 
for estimating onsite ignition probability has also been identified and 
embedded in the consequence assessment process to enable better 
prediction of impact and risk. 
• Fire Consequence Modeling: A comprehensive literature review has been 
carried out to analyze the modeling techniques available to model fire 
radiation hazards. For each of the offshore fires, most appropriate model 
has been identified and selected for the current application. Further, the 
models were refined by making revisions wherever necessary by 
incorporating wind and confinement effects, which are unique to offshore 
process facilities. 
• Fire Overpressure impact: The importance of overpressure caused due to 
fire in a confined or semi-confined space has been highlighted by Wighus 
(1994). However, there appears to have been no attempt to quantify this 
phenomenon. A model has therefore been developed to study the 
overpressure impact. This model is embedded in the basic fire 
consequence modeling methodology described herein. 
• Explosion Consequence Modeling: Available explosion modeling 
techniques were reviewed and suitable one was selected for the specific 
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requirements imposed. Appropriate models for offshore gas explosions 
and BLEVE were identified. 
• Missile impact model: A new model has been developed to determine the 
probability of impact of missiles on objects in the neighborhood by 
employing statistical distributions for stochastic and uncertain 
parameters. This model can also be used to analyze the possibility of 
escalation of events, the phenomenon often termed as domino effect 
analysis. 
• Radiation and blast consequence modeling: Instead of point/ area 
modeling, a grid-based approach has been developed and employed to 
enable better modeling and analysis of radiation and overpressure impact 
at different locations in the process area, plotting the results as contours. 
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. This first chapter has provided 
an introduction to the characteristics of offshore oil and gas process operations 
and an overview of the previous accidents. Importance of QRA for the offshore 
industry, various software packages currently available for consequence analysis 
and their features were also discussed, followed by the objectives set out for this 
research. 
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Chapter 2: This chapter provides an overview of offshore consequence analysis. 
Particularly, process accidents such as fires and explosions are emphasized and 
the procedures to analyze the consequences from these accidents have been 
discussed. Also, the necessary models to carry out such analyses are identified 
and discussed. 
Chapter 3: Release, dispersion and ignition form the major initiatives for any 
process related accidents such as fires and explosions. This chapter presents the 
details of the release, gas dispersion and ignition models adopted in the present 
study. 
Chapter 4: This chapter elaborates the extensive literature review carried out in 
fire consequence modeling to select the state-of-the-art consequence models that 
are necessary for performing a fire consequence study as identified in chapter 2. 
Modeling details of the selected ones are discussed as well. In addition, a model 
for fire overpressure impact assessment has been developed and discussed. 
Chapter 5: This chapter focuses on the extensive literature review carried out in 
explosion consequence modeling to select the state-of-the-art consequence 
models that are necessary for performing an explosion consequence study as 
identified in chapter 2. Modeling details of the selected ones are discussed as 
9 
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well. Additionally, a new probabilistic model has been developed, to analyze the 
damage caused by missiles to the people and the process area. 
Chapter 6: With the successful selection of the necessary and appropriate models 
for offshore conditions, as discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5, computer codes were 
developed in MA TLAB for fire and explosion consequence analysis. This task 
was achieved by simulating the suite of fire consequence models and explosion 
consequence models for various accident scenarios. A grid based approach has 
been introduced and employed during the simulation process, details of which 
are provided in this chapter. 
Chapter 7: This chapter discusses the simulation results of various fire and 
explosion accident scenarios. The results are in the form of hazard potentials and 
the corresponding consequences to people. With the help of a grid based 
approach the result were plotted more interactively in the form of contours over 
a predefined process area. The comparison and validation of these results with 
those obtained by the models used in commercial software packages has also 
been discussed. 
Chapter 8: The final conclusions of this work and future recommendations for 
the research have been provided in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
OFFSHORE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides an overview of offshore consequence analysis. 
Different types of offshore accidents considered in this study have been 
discussed. The procedures to analyze the consequences from these accidents 
have been formulated and the models required to carry out consequence studies 
have been identified and discussed herein. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Section 1.2 and shown in Figure 1.1, QRA involves four 
main steps: hazard identification, consequence analysis, probability calculation 
and finally risk quantification. Consequence analysis, which is considered to be 
central to QRA, involves quantification of the likely loss or damage due to 
anticipated eventualities. The main aim of performing a consequence analysis is 
to identify the personnel, equipment, plant and structure that are exposed to the 
initial and escalating events, and to assess the likely effects and failures. 
Assessing the consequences from various loss-producing events on offshore 
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platforms is referred to as offshore consequence analysis. Nevertheless, the 
methodology of consequence analysis remains the same irrespective of offshore 
or onshore conditions, only the models used to perform the analysis would vary. 
Offshore accidents are usually classified as process accidents, non-process 
fires, blowouts, collision accidents, structural failures, earthquakes, helicopter 
accidents, dropped objects, diving accidents and construction accidents. Among 
all, process accidents pose higher percentage of risk to the personnel onboard 
(HSE, 1996 and Mansfield et al., 1996a). Therefore, in the present study only 
process related accidents are considered. Among the process related accidents 
fires and explosions are the most frequently reported hazardous events. They 
have a potential to cause major damage to the personnel, equipment, structure 
and the environment. This fact is reflected from the Piper Alpha disaster (6 July 
1988), the worst ever disaster in the history of offshore accidents. It was initiated 
by a condensate leak in the gas compression module, which ignited and 
exploded leading to pool fires and jet fires on the platform that in turn escalated 
through secondary explosions and fires eventually destroying the whole 
platform and killing 167 people (Spouge, 1999). 
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Since this incident, the offshore industry, along with the regulatory 
agencies of most of the countries, has come up stringent rules, making QRA 
compulsory with the risk associated with the platform be reduced to ALARP, for 
new as well as existing offshore platforms. With QRA being made compulsory, 
in recent times a great deal of research work has been carried out (Johnson et al., 
1994, 1997, Cracknell et al., 1994, Rew et al., 1997, 1998, Chamberlain, 1996, 
Chamberlain & Persaud, 1997, Van den Berg, et al. 1997, 2000, Baker et al. 1998, 
2000, 2004, Puttock, 1999, 2000 and Lea et al. 2002) that was directed towards 
understanding the characteristics of hydrocarbon fires and explosions. This 
research has resulted in the development of numerous fire and explosion models 
for consequence studies that can be further used for risk assessment studies. 
However, due to increased complexity involved in solving these models, the use 
of computer-automated toolkits becomes inevitable. 
The present study is focused on developing one such toolkit to perform 
fire and explosion consequence analysis by embedding the state-of-the-art fire 
and explosion consequence models in it. However, in order to develop the 
computer codes successfully, two things are considered very important: 
(i) Formulation of the procedures for fire and explosion consequence 
analysis, and 
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( ii) Identification of the necessary consequence models required to 
perform such analyses. 
The following sections emphasize these two points. Fire and explosion 
consequence analyses are considered as two separate entities, hence are dealt 
with in two different sections. The details of fire consequence analysis are dealt 
within Section 2.2, whereas that of explosion is dealt within Section 2.3. 
2.2. FIRE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
Fire consequence analysis is defined as the process of analyzing the 
consequences from fires (Phillips, 1994, Ditali et al., 2000, CCPS, 2000, and 
Krueger et al., 2003, Pula et al., 2005). Consequences from fires are evaluated in 
terms of damage to personnel, equipment, structure and the environment. Only 
consequences to personnel (injury to the people) are considered in this work. 
Fires occur when a leakage or spillage of flammable material is triggered 
by one of any number of potential ignition sources (sparks, open flames, etc.). 
Depending on the type of material released, nature of the release and the time of 
ignition, offshore fires are mainly classified into four types: pool fires, jet fires, 
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fireballs and flash fires (Lees, 1996 and Pula et al., 2004). A brief description 
follows: 
i) Pool fire - a burning pool of hydrocarbon liquid released in a blowout or 
from oil leaks. Heat radiation from this type of fire can be lethal to 
personnel. An oil pool fire often results in a large smoke plume, which can 
also prove to be lethal if inhaled. Also, excess smoke causes impaired 
visibility along escape routes, leading to deaths during mustering. 
Toxicity effects from the gases such as carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide 
and traces of other gases, released during combustion are also significant. 
ii) Jet fire - a burning jet of gas or spray of vapor released from high 
pressure equipment. This represents a significant element of risk to the 
personnel on offshore installations. Radiation heat flux and the 
impingement characteristics are the main sources of damage to personnel. 
iii) Fireball - a spherical fire resulting from sudden release of pressurized 
liquid or gas that is immediately ignited. Although it may only last a few 
seconds, this can be lethal for personnel at distances close to the fireball 
due to its high radiation effects. 
iv) Flash fire - a fire that propagates through a cloud of gas. This may be 
lethal for anyone within it, but is unlikely to damage steel structures. 
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Although there are additional fires like flares, fires on the sea surface and 
running liquid fires, they are in one way or the other modeled as one of the 
above defined types. For example, flares are treated as vertical jet fires, and fires 
on the water surface and running liquid fires are treated as pool fires. Therefore 
only these four fires have been considered within this work. 
The damage to the personnel from these fires is mainly caused due to the 
hazard potentials such as external thermal radiation, smoke and toxicity effects 
and overpressure impacts. Overpressure impact from fires in confined spaces is 
one of the important hazards often neglected in fire consequence modeling that 
has been highlighted by Wighus (1994). With only small openings 1n a 
compartment, the highly energized combustion products released from these 
fires can generate pressures greater than ambient. This is considered to be 
significant. As there was no attempt to quantify the possible impacts from fire 
overpressures, a model has been developed and used in the present work. 
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Process leak 
Fuel Release and 
dispersion 
Delayed 
Figure 2.1: Scenario for the occurrence of variety of fires 
The scenario for the occurrence of the four types of fires mentioned earlier 
1s presented in Figure 2.1. It is apparent that any fire event begins with an 
incident leading to loss of fuel from the process. Typical incidents include the 
rupture or break of a pipeline, leak in a tank or pipe etc. The procedure for 
analyzing the consequences initiating from such incidents and the necessary 
models required to perform the analysis are the topics of the subsequent sections. 
17 
Chapter 2. Offshore Consequence Analysis 
2.2.1. PROCEDURE FOR FIRE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
As is evident from the earlier discussion, any process related accident 
initiates from a process leak. Fuel released due to such a leak starts dispersing 
and results in a fire upon ignition of the dispersing cloud. The procedure to 
analyze consequences from this scenario (CCPS, 2000) is described as follows: 
1. Upon fuel discharge, the first step is to estimate the rate of discharge of 
the fuel or the total quantity discharged. Source/release models are then 
selected based on the phase of release and can be effectively used to 
serve the purpose. 
2. The second step is to determine how the released material is transported 
downwind and dispersed to some concentration levels. Dispersion 
models can be used to predict these characteristics. 
3. The third step is to predict the probable chances for the dispersing cloud 
to get ignited. An ignition model can be used to estimate the probability 
of ignition of the dispersing cloud. 
4. Fuel ignition leads to a fire. The fourth step is then to determine the 
characteristics of the resultant fire such as the burning properties, flame 
dimensions, etc. Individual fire models for the corresponding fires can be 
used to predict these features. 
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5. The possible hazards from fires are external thermal radiation, smoke, 
toxicity effects and overpressure impacts. In the fifth step, the hazard 
potentials associated with each hazard are quantified. Radiation models, 
smoke and toxicity models and fire overpressure models can be used for 
this purpose. 
6. The sixth step is to translate the incident specific results or the hazards 
potentials of radiation, smoke, toxic gases and fire overpressure into 
effects on people (injury or fatality). Human impact models can be used 
to quantify this effect. Finally, a grid based model can be used to analyze 
these consequence results in a better way. 
The procedure described so far is represented in the form of a flowchart 
shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Leak in a process unit 
Discharge of the material 
Use release models to determine the release rate or total 
quantity released. 
Dispersion of the released material 
Use appropriate dispersion models to determine the area 
affected (cloud dimensions) and the expected vapor 
concentration. 
Ignition of the dispersed cloud 
Use ignition models to determine the probability of 
ignition of the dispersed vapor cloud leading to fires. 
Determination of Fire characteristics 
Use individual fire modes to estimate flame dimensions, 
other physical properties like fuel burning rate, flame tilt 
etc. 
Estimation of Fire Hazard Potentials 
Use radiation model to 
estimate the radiation 
heat flux at the target 
object 
Use overpressure model to 
estimate the blast 
characteristic caused by the 
hot combustion gases. 
Use stoichiometric equations 
to determine the amount of 
smoke generated and the 
toxic gases released. 
/ 
Evaluation of Consequences 
Use probit models for radiation, overpressure and toxicity 
to translate the corresponding effects into personnel harm 
(%fatalitv). 
Grid based Approach 
Use multi-point grid based approach to enable better 
analysis of radiation, toxic gases and overpressure 
consequences and for representing them as contours over 
the process area. 
Figure 2.2. Procedure for Fire consequence analysis 
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2.2.2. CONSEQUENCE MODELS REQUIRED 
Based on the procedure described in the previous section, it is apparent 
that the models required to perform a fire consequence analysis are release 
models, dispersion models, ignition models, individual fire models, radiation 
model, overpressure model, smoke and toxicity models and human impact 
models. All the models together form a comprehensive fire consequence model 
suite. A brief description of each of the models follows: 
i) Release models: These models determine the rate of fuel release or the 
amount of fuel released. Release models are very significant; as this is the 
initial step for consequence analysis, improper selection may prove highly 
sensitive for the overall consequences estimated. Details about these 
models are elaborated in Section 3.1. 
ii) Dispersion models: The gases or vapor released as a result of a leak start 
dispersing. These models can predict the dispersion characteristics of the 
vapor cloud in terms of estimating the area affected (cloud dimensions) 
and the expected vapor concentration. Details are provided in Section 3.2. 
iii) Ignition models: Ignition models are used to carry out a probabilistic 
analysis to evaluate the probability of ignition of the dispersed vapor 
cloud. Modeling details are presented in Section 3.3. 
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iv) Fire models: These models estimate the characteristics of the fires which 
are later used to evaluate the radiation heat flux. For example, in the case 
of a pool fire, the model estimates the fire diameter, flame length, flame 
drag, flame tilt etc. Details of fire modeling for pool fires, jet fires, fireballs 
and flash fires are provided in Sections 4.1.1, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1 respectively. 
v) Radiation models: These models are used to quantify the radiation heat 
flux at a target object. Each type of fire has a specific set of equations for 
estimating the radiation heat flux. These equations are based on the flame 
dimensions and fire characteristics, which are obtained from the fire 
models. Details of radiation models for all the four types of fires are 
provided in Sections 4.1.2, 4.2.2, 4.3.2, 4.4.2. 
vi) Smoke and Toxicity (CO and C02) models: A large amount of smoke is 
released due to combustion of heavy hydrocarbons on offshore platforms. 
In addition, incomplete combustion of fuels will result in the release of 
toxic gases. These models estimate the amount of smoke and toxic gases 
released, details of which are presented in Section 4.5. 
vii) Overpressure model: This model is used to quantify the overpressures 
and investigate possible blast effects caused by the hot combustion gases 
released in a confined environment. A model has been developed for 
quantifying this effect and is discussed in Section 4.6. 
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viii) Human impact models: Probit models are used to translate the fire hazard 
potentials such as radiation heat flux, blast overpressure and toxicity 
effects into damage to assets and harm to personnel. Details of individual 
probit models are provided in Section 4.7. 
ix) Grid based model: A multipoint grid based model has been developed 
and employed to enable better modeling and analysis of radiation impact 
at various locations in the process area. The radiation and fatality results 
are eventually plotted as contours, a more user friendly way of 
representation than the conventional method where the results are 
represented as line plots. Details are discussed in chapter 6. 
2.3. EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
Explosion consequence analysis is defined as the process of analyzing the 
consequences from a variety of explosions (Ditali et al., 2000, CCPS, 1994, 1996, 
1998, 2000, and Pula et al., 2005). The explosions that commonly occur on an 
offshore platform are classified as (Spouge, 1999): 
i) Gas explosions 
• Explosions in unconfined, congested areas (e.g. on the deck of an 
FPSO) 
• Explosions in confined areas (e.g. within a compartment or module) 
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• External explosions (e.g. following a confined, vented explosion) 
ii) Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVE). 
The scenario for the occurrence of these explosions is presented in Figure 
2.3. Other types of explosions include physical explosions (caused by excess 
pressure in a vessel), internal explosions (within a flare stack), mist explosions 
and solid phase explosions (e.g. associated with the use of well completion 
explosives). The modeling of internal explosions, mist explosions, and solid 
phase explosions is not well understood and needs further research efforts. 
Hence, only gas explosions and BLEVE are discussed within this work. 
No 
Partially confined gas 
explosion 
Release and 
Dispersion 
Delayed 
Ignition 
Yes 
Fire 
Impingement 
Confined and Vented 
gas explosion 
Figure 2.3: Scenario for the occurrence of variety of explosions 
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Again, only consequences to the people are considered. The consequences 
from explosions are either in the form of direct blast effects such as lung or ear 
drum ruptures or indirect effects such as impact from missiles projected by the 
explosion. The procedure for analyzing these consequences and the necessary 
models required to perform the analysis are the topics of the subsequent sections. 
2.3.1. PROCEDURE FOR EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
A gas explosion occurs due to delayed ignition of the vapor cloud subject 
to the fact that the gas is released in a congested area that is capable enough to 
enhance the flame speed. The procedure to analyze consequences from this 
scenario (CCPS, 2000 and Ditali et al., 2000) is described as follows: 
1. Upon fuel discharge, the first step is to estimate the rate of discharge of 
the fuel or the total quantity discharged. Source/release models are then 
selected based on the phase of release and can be effectively used to 
serve the purpose. 
2. The second step is to determine how the released rna terial is transported 
downwind and dispersed to some concentration levels. Dispersion 
models can be used to predict these characteristics. 
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3. The third step is to predict the probable chances for the dispersing cloud 
to get ignited. An ignition model can be used to estimate the probability 
of ignition of the dispersing cloud. 
4. Ignition of the dispersing cloud leads to an explosion under specific 
conditions such as delayed ignition of the cloud 1n congested 
environment. The fourth step is to determine the explosion 
characteristics like source overpressure, pressure pulse duration, decay 
etc. Gas explosion models can be used to predict these features. 
5. The hazards from explosions are blast overpressure and missile effects. 
In the fifth step, the hazard potentials associated with each hazard are 
quantified. Blast dissipation and missile effects models can be used for 
this purpose. 
6. The sixth step is to translate the incident specific results such as the 
hazards potentials of blast overpressure and missiles into effects on 
people (injury or fatality). Human impact models can be used to quantify 
this effect. Finally, a grid based model can be used to analyze these 
consequence results in a better way. 
The procedure described so far is represented in the form of a flowchart 
shown in Figure 2.4. It should be noted that the first three steps in the 
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consequence analysis for gas explosions are the same as those for fire 
consequence analysis. For the case of a BLEVE scenario, the consequence analysis 
procedure is not as complex as gas explosions. It involves only three steps, 
similar to those explained in steps 4, 5, 6 above in which source overpressure, 
pressure pulse duration and decay are estimated, followed by estimation of 
hazard potentials and corresponding consequences. 
27 
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Leak incident in a 
process unit 
~ 
Discharge of the material 
Use release models to determine the release rate, total 
quantity release, material phase. 
!-
Dispersion of the released material 
Use appropriate dispersion models to determine the area 
affected (cloud dimensions) and the expected vapor 
concentration. 
~ 
Ignition of the dispersed cloud 
Use ignition models to determine the probability of 
ignition of the dispersed vapor cloud. 
~ 
Determination of Explosion characteristics 
Use individual gas explosion models to estimate source 
overpressure, pressure pulse duration and decay. 
~ 
Estimation of Explosion Hazard Potentials 
Use blast dissipation model Use missile effects model to 
to estimate the overpressure estimate the impact energy at 
effects at the target object. < :> the target object and assess the 
possibility of escalation in the 
accidents. 
~ 
Evaluation of Consequences 
Use probit models for blast overpressure and missile 
effects to translate the corresponding effects into personnel 
harm (%fatalitv) at the defined tare:et. 
~ 
Grid based model 
Use multi-point grid based approach to enable better 
analysis of the blast, missile effect consequences and for 
representing them as contours over the process area. 
Figure 2.4: Procedure for gas explosion consequence 
analysis 
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2.3.2. CONSEQUENCE MODELS REQUIRED 
Based on the procedure described in the previous section, it is apparent 
that the models required to perform an explosion consequence analysis are 
release models, dispersion models, ignition models, explosion models, blast 
dissipation models, missile effects model and human impact models. All the 
models together form an explosion consequence model suite. A brief 
description of each of the models follows: 
i) Release models: These models are used to determine the amount of fuel 
released or the rate of fuel release. Details are elaborated in Section 3.1. 
ii) Dispersion models: These models predict the dispersion characteristics of 
the vapor cloud in terms of estimating the dimensions and the physical 
properties of the gas cloud. Literature review, modeling details are 
provided in Section 3.2. 
iii) Ignition models: Ignition models are used to carry out a probabilistic 
analysis to evaluate the probability of ignition of the dispersed vapor 
cloud. Modeling details are presented in Section 3.3. 
iv) Explosion models: These models estimate the explosion characteristics 
and predict certain parameters like source overpressure, pressure pulse 
duration and decay. Details of gas explosion models for partially confined 
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and totally confined cases are presented in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2 
respectively. BLEVE details are provided in 5.2. 
v) Blast dissipation model: This model is used to quantify the blast 
overpressure at a target object located at a certain distance from the 
explosion source. It remains the same for all the types of gas explosions. 
Overpressure dissipation model details are provided in Sections 5.1.1. 
vi) Missile Effects model: A new probabilistic model has been developed to 
analyze the damage caused by missiles to the process area. It can also be 
used to assess the possible chances of escalation of accidental events. 
Details are discussed in Section 5.3. 
vii) Human impact models: Pro bit models are used to translate the fire hazard 
potentials such as radiation heat flux, blast overpressure and toxicity 
effects into damage to assets and harm to personneL Details of individual 
probit models are provided in Section 5.4. 
viii) Grid based model: A multipoint grid based model has been developed 
and employed to enable better modeling and analysis of overpressure 
impact. This model helps in plotting the blast dissipation and fatality 
results as contours. Details are provided in chapter 6. 
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2.4. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an overview of offshore consequence analysis. 
Particularly, process accidents such as fires and explosions were emphasized and 
the procedures to analyze the consequences from these accidents were discussed. 
Also, the necessary models to carry out such analyses were identified. 
The subsequent chapters will present the details of the extensive literature 
review that has been carried out for selecting the state-of-the-art consequence 
models that are suitable to be used in offshore conditions. The selected models 
were further revised wherever possible. In case of unavailability of certain 
models in the literature, new models were developed and discussed. Chapter 3 
deals with source/release, dispersion and ignition modeling, whereas chapters 4 
and 5 deal with fire and explosion consequence models respectively. The 
literature review was followed by selection and revision of models, then 
computer codes were developed utilizing the procedures provided in this 
chapter and the revised models. Results obtained by simulating various credible 
accident scenarios were finally discussed in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 3 
RELEASE, DISPERSION AND IGNITION 
MODELS 
As discussed in the previous chapter, release, gas dispersion and ignition 
models form the major initiatives for the overall consequence analysis. In this 
chapter a comprehensive literature review of available models has been carried 
out and the modeling details of adopted models are elaborated. Models are 
adopted considering their appropriateness to offshore process conditions, 
flexibility to map different scenarios and validation against experimental 
observations. 
3.1. RELEASE MODELS 
Source models or release models (CCPS, 2000 and Crowl & Louvar, 2002) 
are used to estimate the amount of fuel released, or the rate of fuel release. These 
models are crucial in the risk assessment process as the release rate and quantity 
of fuel released determine the size of the resulting cloud and hence the 
probability of ignition. 
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The initial release rate through a leak depends mainly on the chemical 
characteristics, pressure inside the equipment, and size of the hole and the phase 
of release. Offshore hydrocarbon releases are usually gaseous, liquid and two-
phase. Among these, the gaseous hydrocarbons range from Cl to C4, while 
liquids are crude oil, diesel oil, aviation fuel, and others. Condensate is 
considered to be two-phase as it is a mixture of hydrocarbons mainly C4 to C6 
that condense from the gas during compression. This material is liquid while it is 
held under pressure but becomes gas if the pressure is released. Identification of 
the appropriate phase and its corresponding model is essential, as, this being the 
initial step for risk assessment, it may prove to be highly sensitive to the risk 
estimated. Models for two phase releases are not considered in the present study 
as it demands further research and experimental validation. However, the details 
of release models for liquid and gaseous releases (as a result of holes in process 
equipment), used in this work are described in the subsequent sections. 
3.1.1 LIQUID RELEASE MODEL 
For liquid releases, the driving force for the discharge is pressure, with the 
pressure energy being converted into kinetic energy during the discharge. 
Therefore, the mass flow rate of liquid from a leak in a vessel below the liquid 
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level can be calculated using the Bernoulli equation (Crowl & Louvar, 2002) 
given as, 
( R -P J rh=CdxpxA 2x 1 p a +gxhs (3.1) 
where rh is the mass discharge rate, Cd is the discharge coefficient (0.60 
recommended for liquids), p is the density of the liquid, A is the area of leak, ~ 
is the absolute pressure at which the liquid is stored, Pa is the ambient pressure, 
g is the acceleration due to gravity and hs is the static head of liquid. 
3.1.2 GASN APOR RELEASE MODEL 
Gaseous releases through holes can be sonic or subsonic depending on the 
pressure inside the equipment in relation with the critical pressure. The critical 
pressure, Pcrit, is calculated as, 
~rit = pa 2 ( J
r-I/r 
y+l (3.2) 
If the pressure inside the equipment Pg is above the critical pressure Pcrit, 
the flow is sonic. This is also known as choked flow condition. The mass flow 
rate for choked flow condition can be calculated using: 
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(3.3) 
If the flow is subsonic (P g is below the critical pressure P crit) the mass flow 
rate can be calculated as, 
y+l 
yxMW x(-2-Jy-J 
RgTg y+l (3.4) 
(3.5) 
where, y is the isentropic expansion factor (Cp/Cv), m is the mass discharge 
rate, Cd is the discharge coefficient (~0.8 for gases), A is the leak area, MW is the 
molecular weight, Tg is the temperature of the vessel, Rg is the ideal gas constant, 
P a is the ambient pressure and Pg is the absolute pressure of the gas. 
3.2. GAS DISPERSION MODELS 
The gas (or vapor flashed from liquid releases) that is released during an 
accident, form clouds and are dispersed by the initial momentum of the release, 
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turbulence around the obstructions, natural ventilation and the wind. Dispersion 
models are used to estimate the dimensions of these clouds, varying with time 
and space in an unobstructed uniform field (CCPS 1996), or a highly obstructed 
field (CCPS, 1998). 
The main categories of releases encountered offshore are release in 
confined, congested areas of the platform, release in open areas or outside the 
platform, and release under water. The modeling of gas dispersion in the 
presence of obstacles demands the use of highly complex computational fluid 
dynamic (CFD) models, which are supposed to give good results, but are highly 
sensitive and need validation with the experimental data. Moreover there is a 
necessity for expertise to use the CFD models for simulating the gas dispersion. 
On the other hand, for dispersion in uniform wind fields without any 
obstructions, box or slab models (Lees, 1996) and the Pascal Gifford model 
(Crowl and Louver, 2002) can be used for dense gas releases and neutrally 
buoyant releases, respectively. These models are employed in the present study 
and are described as follows. 
3.2.1 DENSE GAS DISPERSION MODEL 
A Box model (Cox and Carpenter, 1980) predicts the dense gas dispersion 
behavior quite efficiently and has few limitations, such as its applicability for 
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only open and flat terrain and inability to handle obstacles. However these 
limitations can be overcome by adopting a grid based model, discussed 
elsewhere in chapter 6. 
SOURCE 
WIND DIRECTION 
... 
Figure 3.1. Vapor cloud dimensions for an 
instantaneous release of gas. 
For instantaneous gaseous releases, the cloud formed is assumed as a 
circular cylinder as shown in Figure 3.1. Box model for these releases is based on 
three simultaneous differential equations for the downwind distance 'x' of the 
cloud, the radius 'R' of the cloud and the volume 'V' of the cloud. The 
corresponding equations are: 
i) The rate of change of downwind distance of the center of the cloud is 
given as: 
(3.6) 
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(3.7) 
where, u c (t) is the mean velocity of the cloud, ur is the mean wind velocity at a 
reference height, H is height of the cloud (m), zr is the reference height (lOrn) 
and Z
0 
is the roughness length. Roughness length varies from 0.001 to 0.01 for 
normal flat surfaces and is 1 for industrial areas (CCPS, 1996). 
ii) Rate of change of the cloud radius is given as: 
dR ( , V ]
112 
dt =cE g 1lR2 (3.8) 
where, cE = 1.15 
iii) Rate of change of volume is given as: 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
0.6u* R" _ , H , _ Pc- Pa 
Ue = , l * - g -2-, g - g 
(1 + 0.8Ri* )1 12 u* Pa 
(3.12 a, b, c) 
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where, v is total volume of the cloud, Qe is the volumetric flow of air entrained 
at the edge of the cloud, which is assumed to be negligible, Qt is the total 
volumetric flow of air entrained at the top of the cloud, u* is friction velocity, 
usually equal to about 5-10°/o of the wind speed at a height of 10m, Ri* is the 
Richardson number, Pc is density of the cloud and Pa is density of the ambient 
air. 
These three differential equations and the corresponding algebraic 
equations are solved simultaneously to obtain the movement of the cloud, 
change in the radius of the cloud and volume of the cloud varying with time. The 
analytical solution is: 
1 
R2 =R; +2cE(~ V,y Xt 
2 
vi= nR Uet 
3.2.2 PASSIVE GAS DISPERSION MODEL 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
A standard gas dispersion model, which is used in many commercial 
software packages for the dispersion of neutrally buoyant gases, is the "Gaussian 
model". This model assumes, on the basis of empirical data, that a Gaussian 
39 
Chapter 3. Release, Dispersion and Ignition models 
distribution can adequately describe the concentration profiles in both horizontal 
and vertical directions. Among the Gaussian models, Pasquill-Gifford plume and 
puff models (Lees, 1996 and Crowl & Louver, 2002) are widely used. It has 
similar limitations as Box models, and can be handled in the same way as 
mentioned earlier. Despite these limitations, they predict conservative estimates 
of the downwind gas concentration in the plume and the puff for continuous and 
instantaneous release respectively. 
The puff model for an instantaneous point source at height h above ground is 
given as, 
( ) m [- y
2 
] { [- ( z - h f ] [- ( z + h )2 ]} C x,y,z,t = 3 exp -2- x exp 2 +exp 2 (2n)2 xax xa Y xaz 2a y 2az 2az (3.16) 
Similarly, plume model defines the concentration at any point (x, y, z) downwind 
of an elevated source as, 
c(x,y,z) = m exp[- Y: ]x{exp[- (z-;f] +exp[- (z + ;)2 ]} (3.17) 
2nxuxayxaz 2a 2a 2a y z z 
where, ax, a y , a z are the dispersion coefficients in the downwind, crosswind 
and vertical (x, y, z) directions (Lees 1996, Crowl & Louver, 2002), m is the 
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quantity of gas released instantaneously, the rh is the gas release rate, u is the 
wind velocity, h is the release height, x is distance along the plume centerline, z 
is height above ground and y is the lateral displacement from plume centerline. 
For ground level releases substitute h equal to 0 in both the cases. 
3.3. IGNITION MODEL 
Among the currently available models, a few are based on the assumption 
that ignition probability is solely a function of size of the flammable gas cloud 
(CCPS, 1998 and Spencer & Rew, 1997), while the others incorporate some 
additional features (Rew et. al. 2000, 2004) such as multiple ignition sources, 
density of ignition sources, different land use types, ignition potential of each 
source etc. The model developed by Rew et al. (2004) for onsite ignition 
probability estimation is relatively sophisticated and is formulated in such a way 
that it can be implemented within risk analysis models. This model was 
employed for the present study. The equations used in the model are described 
below. 
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3.3.2 0NSITE IGNITION MODEL 
For a flammable cloud of area A, containing a random distribution of 
ignition sources with parameters A, p and a, the probability of no ignition at 
time t in a given type of scenario is 
Q(t) = exp(- pA {z- (1- ap )e -}qJt }) (3.18) 
where, p, is the average number of ignition sources per unit area, pis the 
ignition potential of a source (0-1), a is the rate of activation of the source, and A 
is the proportion of time that the source is active. 
1 A=---
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
If there are n different ignition sources in a given scenario, the probability 
of no ignition is given as: 
n Q(t )= I]Qi (3.21) 
i=l 
For m scenario types, the probability of the cloud not having ignited at 
time t is given as: 
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m n Q(t)= OOQji(t) (3.22) 
j=li=l 
Hence, the probability of ignition is: 
(3.23) 
The details of scenario types, ignition sources and ignition source 
parameters used in the model are listed in Table 3.1, Rew et al. (2004). 
Table 3.1. Ignition source parameters for various sources in different land use 
types 
Scenario type Ignition sources 
Ignition source parameters 
p ta ti a A. Jl 
Continuous 1.00 - 0 1.00 0.000 1 
Flames Infrequent 1.00 60 420 0.13 0.002 2 
Intermittent 1.00 5 55 0.08 0.017 2 
Accornrnodation Smoking 1.00 5 115 0.04 0.008 2 
Kitchen facilities Cooking equipment 0.25 5 25 0.17 0.033 1 
Boiler house Boiler 1.00 120 360 0.25 0.002 1 
Heavy equipment 0.50 - - 1.00 0.028 2 
Process area Medium equipment 0.25 - - 1.00 0.035 2 
Light equipment 0.10 - - 1.00 0.056 2 
Office Light equipment levels 0.05 - - 1.00 0.056 2 
Storage Materials handling 0.10 10 20 0.333 0.033 1 
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Chapter 4 
FIRE CONSEQUENCE MODELING 
This chapter provides an overview of consequence modeling of fires 
which commonly occur on offshore platforms, e.g. pool fires, jet fires, fireballs 
and flash fires. A comprehensive literature review carried out related to each fire 
consequence model has been discussed in their respective sections. Additionally, 
fire overpressure impact and human impact models are also discussed in detail. 
By reviewing the predictive models for modeling fire hazards, it was 
found that many models exist- varying from point source techniques to more 
complex computational fluid dynamic (CFD) calculations. Such predictive 
models can be categorized as: semi-empirical models (point source models (Lees, 
1996) and solid flame models (Johnson et al., 1994, Cracknell et al., 1994, andRew et 
al., 1997, 1998)), field models (Johnson et al., 1997), integral models (Wilcox, 1975 
and Vachon & Champion, 1986), and zone models (Chamberlain, 1996 and 
Chamberlain & Persaud, 1997). 
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Among all these models, the well-validated solid flame models provide a 
better prediction of flame geometry and external thermal radiation for offshore 
fires. Also, these models are mathematically simple and can be easily computer 
programmed with short run times. In recent times, these models have been 
successfully used for fire consequence analysis and further, for Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (Rew et al., 1997, 1998, Johnson et al., 1994, and Cracknell et al., 
1994). Therefore, semi-empirical solid flame models have been chosen to be the 
basis for selecting fire models and subsequently using them in the development 
of a consequence analysis toolkit. As identified earlier, the fires that commonly 
occur on offshore platforms are categorized as pool fires, jet fires, fireballs and 
flash fires (vapor cloud fires). In the subsequent sections, a literature review 
carried out for individual fire models has been provided followed by the 
description of modeling details of the selected ones. 
4.1. POOL FIRES 
n A pool fire is a turbulent diffusion flame burning above a pool of vaporizing 
hydrocarbon fuel where the fuel vapor has negligible initial momentum" (Rew et al., 
1997). 
Liquid fuel released accidentally during overfilling of storage tanks, 
rupture of pipes and tanks etc., forms a pool on the surface, vaporizes, and upon 
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ignition, results in a pool fire. Consequence models for pool fires in open spaces 
have been well documented over the past few years (Rew et al., 1997, Pritchard & 
Bi nding, 1992, and Johnson, 1992). After reviewing the pool fire models available 
in the literature, the model described by Rew et al. (1997) was judged to be most 
suitable for the current work because of the following reasons: 
a) This model (POOLFIRE6) was developed after an extensive review of 
literature followed by undertaking full-scale measurements to assess the 
current status of pool fire modeling. 
b) It has been compared with the existing models developed by Pritchard & 
Binding (1992) and Johnson (1992) and found to have obtained superior 
results. 
c) Upon performing model validation and uncertainty analysis, it was found 
that the model predicts with a 90°/o confidence level, which seems to be 
reasonable for risk assessment studies. 
Wind effects are significant in deciding certain parameters such as flame 
drag, flame tilt and flame length. In the selected model, flame drag and flame tilt 
were modeled as a function of wind parameters; however flame length was 
considered independent of wind parameters. Therefore, the model has been 
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revised using the work of Thomas (1963) to account for the wind effect on flame 
length. A description of the selected radiation model (Rew et al., 1997) follows. 
4.1.1 POOL FIRE MODEL 
A pool fire is usually modeled as a sheared elliptical cylinder which is 
assumed to radiate in two layers- a high emissive power, clean burning zone at 
the base, with a smoky obscured layer above as shown in Figure 4.1. 
L 
Target 
Figure 4.1. Flame geometry for a tilted pool fire 
The parameters that can capture the characteristics of a pool fire and their 
corresponding correlations are given below. 
i) Size of Liquid pool 
Liquid pool size is a function of leak/ spill rate, duration of spill, and 
burning rate. Pool size is particularly important as most of the correlations 
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depend on pool diameter (D). The correlation for maximum possible diameter is 
given as, 
(4.1) 
where, VL is the volumetric spill rate and m is the mass burning rate. 
ii) Liquid Buming Rate 
In general the burning rate increases with pool diameter as the surface to 
volume ratio of the flame decreases and more heat is available to evaporate 
liquid from the surface of the pool. The correlation widely used is, 
· · (l -kD) m=moo -e (4.2) 
where, moo is the maximum burning rate, k is the burning rate size coefficient 
and D is diameter of the pool. 
iii) Flame Length 
The flame length from a pool fire is related to the burning rate, pool size 
and ambient air density. Effect of wind on flame length was accounted for in this 
correlation by using the work of Thomas (1963). 
.!::._=55 m _!!_ ( . ]0.67( J-0.21 D Pair Jiii Uc (4.3) 
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(4.4) 
where, L is the flame length, u is the wind velocity, Pair is the density of air 
and Pv is the density of vapor. 
iv) Flame Tilt and Drag 
Strong wind often causes the flame of a pool fire to tilt and can drag the 
base in the downwind direction. Hence, a pool fire is modeled as a sheared 
elliptical cylinder instead of a circular cylinder. This feature has been captured in 
the following correlations. 
tan(} = J.JJ(Fr )0.431 
cos(} 
D' =1.5(Frf·069 
D 
u2 
Fr=-
gD 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
Where, (} is flame angle from the vertical, u is the wind velocity, Fr is Froude 
number and D' is the diameter of the dragged flame 
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4.1.2 THERMAL RADIATION MODEL 
i) Surface Emissive Power 
A pool fire is modeled to radiate in two different layers as mentioned 
earlier. The surface emissive power for each of the layers is correlated separately. 
Therefore, the Surface Emissive Power of the lower clear flame, SEPL, and the 
upper, smoke obscured layer SEPu is given by, 
SEPL = SEP= (1-e-kmD) (4.8) 
SEPu = U R xSEPL +(1-U R )xSEPs (4.9) 
where, SEPOO is the maximum surface emissive power of a fuel, km is the 
extinction coefficient, u R is unobscured ratio and SEPs is the surface emissive 
power of smoke (approximately 20 kW /m2). 
ii) Radiation Heat flux 
The thermal radiative flux at a target object is given as: 
q=qL +qu =rLxVFLxSEPL +ru xVFu xSEPu (4.10) 
where, r is atmospheric transmissivity, VF is the geometric view factor and SEP 
is average surface emissive power. The subscripts L and U refer to values 
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calculated for the clear lower layer and smoky upper layer of the model flame 
shape, respectively. 
Atmospheric transmissivity is calculated using an algorithm developed 
by Wayne (1991). This calculation is based on the assumptions that the flame is a 
black body source at 1500 K, with COz and HzO vapor being the only molecules 
that absorb radiation in the pathway between the fire and the target. The 
atmospheric transmissivity is given by the formula: 
2 r=1.006 -0.01171log 10 X( H 2 0 )-0.02368(log10 X( H 2 0 )) -
0.03188log10 X( C02 )+0.001164(log1o X( C02 ))2 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
where, RH is the relative humidity expressed as a fraction, PL is path length 
through the atmosphere and smm is the saturated water vapour pressure in mm 
Hg at the ambient temperature. 
The view factor (Davis & Bagster, 1989) represents the fraction of the 
overall heat output that strikes the target, and is dependent upon the geometry 
of both the flame and the target. For radiation from a finite flame to a differential 
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receiving element, the view factor is given by the integral over the flame surface: 
J cos flJ cos [32 VF= 
s m12 
(4.14) 
where j31 and j32 are the angles between the normals to the fire surface and the 
receiving element, respectively, and dis the distance from the receiver point to 
the flame center. 
4.2. JET FIRES 
/1 A jet fire is a turbulent diffusion flame resulting from the combustion of a fuel 
continuously released with some significant momentum in a particular direction" 
Gohnson et al., 1994). 
Jet fires represent a significant element of risk associated with major 
incidents on offshore installations, with the fuels ranging from light flammable 
gases to two-phase crude oil releases. Between horizontal and vertical jet fires, 
the former is the most dangerous because of the high probability of impingement 
on objects downwind (Carsley, 1994). This can lead to structural, storage vessel, 
and pipe-work failures, and can cause further escalation of the event (i.e. domino 
effect). The heat fluxes released from these fires are very high, ranging from 200-
400 k WI m 2 depending on the type of fuel. Almost all the fuels handled offshore 
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can form jet fires provided that the release occurs under conditions such that the 
fluid has some initial momentum (such as a leak from a pressurized gas line). 
Vertical jet fire models (e.g. Chamberlain, 1987) are commonly used to 
assess the hazards from flares. The model of Chamberlain (1987) has been 
extended to horizontal jet fires by Johnson et al. (1994). This model has been 
chosen as the base jet fire model in the current work because of the following 
reasons: 
i) It was developed with offshore conditions in mind and provides the 
required information for all the parameters used in the model. 
ii) This is the only solid flame model available for horizontal jet fires. 
Description of the horizontal jet fire model Oohnson et al., 1994) follows. 
4.2.1 HORIZONTAL JET FIRE MODEL 
A horizontal jet fire is modeled as the truncated frustum of a cone, which 
emits thermal radiation from its surface as shown in Figure 4.2 Oohnson et al., 
1994). For horizontal releases, the buoyancy of the flame dominates over wind 
momentum, causing the flame to rise above the horizontal plane. Because objects 
in the direction of the release receive radiation from emitting paths roughly equal 
to the flame length (which is much larger than the flame width), a different 
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surface emissive power is assigned to the ends of the solid flame from the surface 
emissive power used for the sides of the flame. The important correlations to 
predict the flame shape are mass release rate, flame length, flame lift off, 
maximum and minimum flame widths, angle of tilt etc., all of which are shown 
in Figure 4.2 and described as follows. 
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Figure 4.2. Flame geometry for a horizontal jet fire (from Johnson 
et al., 1994) 
i) Momentum flux 
The initial jet behavior for horizontal releases, when the gas expands 
down to atmospheric pressure, is calculated in the same way as described for 
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vertical releases (Chamberlain, 1987). The expanded jet momentum flux G is 
given by: 
2 2 7rp ·U · d · G = 1 1 1 
4 (4.15) 
where, p j is the expanded jet density, u j is the expanded jet velocity and d j is the 
expanded jet diameter. 
The balance between the initial jet momentum flux and buoyancy is 
characterized by the Richardson number. 
(4.16) 
ii) Flame length in still air 
Length of the flame in still air is used as a basis to estimate the flame 
length in wind conditions. It is correlated with parameters such as the 
Richardson number, source diameter and mass fraction of fuel in a stoichiometric 
mixture of air using a nonlinear algebraic equation, which needs to be solved 
iteratively. The correlations are given as 
(4.17) 
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(4.18) 
where, Ds is the combustion source diameter, MWair is the molecular weight of 
air and Lbo is the flame length in still air. 
iii) Flame length under wind conditions 
The flame length Lbxy depends on two main parameters X, Y which are 
defined as the lengths in x and y directions as shown in the Figure 4.2. 
The correlations to evaluate X are given as: 
where, 
( ) {
0.55 + (l-0.55)exp(-0.168~) 
f ~ = 
0.55 + (l-0.55)exp(-o.J68~ -0.3(~ -5.Jif) 
r(~)= {
0 
0.02(1- exp(-0.5(~- 3.3))) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
; ~5.11 
(4.21a, b) 
(4.22a, b) 
The parameters used to characterize the effect of the wind on the flame length 
are: 
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(4.23) 
1rPair [ J
J/2 
Qz = 4 G LboWair (4.24) 
where, .Qx indicates the extent to which the wind is blowing along or against the 
release direction and is used respectively to elongate and flatten the flame or to 
shorten and raise-up the flame, and .Qz indicates the extent to which the flame is 
blown to either side of the release direction. 
Correlations for Yare given as, 
(4.25) 
(4.26) 
c(;)=O.o2; (4.27) 
iv) Flame lift-off 
A jet with high initial momentum entrains more air per unit length in the 
initial convection dominated part of the jet and burns as a premixed flue flame. 
The lift-off of this flame 'b' is given as, 
- ( )1/2 b- 0.141 Gair (4.28) 
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. v) Maximum width of the flame 
The maximum flame width W2 is correlated with the flame length and the 
wind effecting parameters and is given as, 
vi) Minimum width of the flame 
Similarly the minimum flame width W1 is given as 
W1 /b = -0.18 +0.081~ 
vii) Angle of tilt 
(4.29) 
(4.30) 
As buoyancy of the flame dominates over wind momentum, it causes the 
flame to rise above the horizontal plane. The tilt of the flame a with the vertical 
axis is, therefore given as 
tan(a)= zj(x -b)= 0.178.Qz (4.31) 
4.2.2 THERMAL RADIATION MODEL 
i) Surface Emissive power 
The surface emissive powers for the side and end of the model flame are 
given as, 
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_ ( -kW2) SEPside - SEP oo 1 - e (4.32) 
_ ( _ -kR£) SEPend - SEP oo 1 e (4.33) 
(4.34) 
Fsoo = 0.21 exp(-0.00323u j )+0.14 (4.35) 
where, the factor k is the gas absorption coefficient, W2 is the maximum width of 
the flame, RL is the length of the frustum, Q is the net heat released by 
combustion, SEPOO is the maximum surface emissive power, A is the surface area 
of the flame, Fsoo is the fraction of the overall heat emitted as radiation and Uj is 
the velocity of the jet. 
ii) Radiation Heat flux 
The thermal radiative flux at a target object is given as: 
q = (VFside * SEPside + VFend * SEPend ) * r (4.36) 
where SEP is the average surface emissive power, VF is the geometric view factor 
and the subscripts side and end refer to values calculated for the side and end of 
the model flame shape. Geometric view factors (VF) and atmospheric 
transmissivity ( r) are calculated in the same way as described in Section 4.1.2. 
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4.3. FIREBALL MODEL 
n A fireball is a rapid turbulent combustion of fuel, usually in the form of a rising 
and expanding radiant ball of flame" (Roberts et al., 2000). 
When a fire such as a pool or jet fire impinges on a vessel containing 
pressure-liquefied gas, the pressure in the vessel rises and the vessel wall 
weakens. This can eventually lead to catastrophic failure of the vessel with the 
release of the entire inventory. This phenomenon is known as a boiling liquid 
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). In such releases, the liquefied gas released 
to the atmosphere flashes due to the sudden pressure drop. If the released 
material is flammable, it will ignite; in addition to missile and blast hazards, 
there is thus a thermal radiation hazard from the fireball produced. It is this 
thermal radiation which dominates in the near field. Although the duration of 
the heat pulse from a fireball is typically of the order of 10 - 20 s, the damage 
potential is high due to the fireball's massive surface emissive power. In the 
present approach (Roberts et al., 2000) a fireball is modeled as a sphere as shown 
in Figure 4.3. 
Modeling of fireballs has been carried out by several researchers (e.g. 
Prugh, 1994, Cracknell & Carsley 1997, and Roberts et al., 2000). An alternative 
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fireball scenario to the one described in the previous paragraph, i.e. fireballs from 
delayed ignition of continuous jet releases, has also been dealt with by Cracknell 
& Carsley (1997). For the present study, the model of Roberts et al. (2000) was 
selected as the base fireball model because of the following reasons: 
a) This model was extensively validated against full-scale experimental data. 
b) Fireballs from ignition of instantaneous releases are more common than 
those from continuous jet releases. 
c) This is the only solid flame fireball model developed to date. 
- ..... ----T---.arget 
L 
Figure 4.3. Flame geometry for an expanding, 
rising fireball 
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4.3.1 FIREBALL MODEL 
A fireball, as the name represents is modeled as a spherical ball of flame. 
The solid flame model for a fireball comprises of correlations like fireball 
duration, diameter, lift-off time and its elevation. A radiation model includes 
correlations like surface emissive power and radiation heat flux, details of which 
follow. 
i) Fireball duration 
It is the time taken by the fireball to reach its maximum diameter, usually 
correlated with mass of fuel (M) involved in combustion process as, 
t = 0.825xM 0·26 
ii) Fireball diameter 
(4.37) 
Although fireballs are not exactly spherical, it is the most conservative 
assumption. The diameter of the fireball (D) is related with mass of the fuel (M) 
involved in the combustion process as, 
D = 6.48xM 0325 
iii) Fireball lift-off time 
(4.38) 
In general, hazard calculations assume that fireballs are spherical and 
touch the ground. However, in practice the fireballs start to lift off when 
buoyancy and entrainment are dominant and drift with wind. An empirical 
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equation for lift-off time, which has been correlated with the fuel mass, is given 
as, 
t 10 = l.lxM
116 
iv) Fireball elevation 
(4.39) 
Fireball elevation is the height of the center of the fireball above the 
ground at the time of maximum diameter. This parameter is important because it 
determines the distance of the recipient from the center of the fireball. Elevation 
is again correlated with the fireball diameter as, 
H =0.75xD (4.40) 
4.3.2 THERMAL RADIATION MODEL 
i) Surface emissive power 
Large-scale experiments carried out by Roberts et al. (2000) with propane 
as the fuel, measured a maximum average surface emissive power ranging from 
270- 333 kW /m2 up/downwind and 278- 413 kW /m2 crosswind. Average of 
these values can be used conservatively for risk assessment studies. Also, due to 
the high turbulence involved, a fireball can cause significant overpressures. 
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ii) Radiation Heat flux 
The radiation heat flux incident on a target is evaluated in a similar way 
as for previous fire models by the product of atmospheric transmissivity ( r ), 
geometric view factor (VF) and the surface emissive power (SEP) given as, 
q = VFxSEPxr (4.41) 
Surface emissive powers measured experimentally by Roberts et al. (2000) 
are used, while view factors and transmissivity are evaluated using the 
correlations described in the Section 4.1.2. 
4.4. FLASH FIRE 
n A flash fire is a transient fire resulting from the ignition of a gas or vapor cloud, 
where a delay between the release of flammable material and subsequent ignition has 
allowed a cloud of flammable material to build up and spread out from its release point" 
(CCPS, 1994). 
A flash fire is usually characterized by a nwall of flame" (Raj & Emmons, 
1975 and CCPS, 1994) progressing out from the point of ignition at a moderate 
velocity until the whole flammable cloud has burned. Similar to fireballs, flash 
fires can occur either by ignition of a flammable vapor cloud formed from an 
instantaneous release, or by delayed ignition of a cloud from a continuous 
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release, provided the turbulence in the cloud is low enough that a fireball does 
not occur. The instantaneous or continuous releases considered in risk studies 
would physically correspond to a spreading transient puff or a long steady-state 
plume. 
When the cloud ignites, the initial damage will be caused primarily by 
thermal radiation. However, flash fires may generate more damaging uknock-
on" events, especially if they burn back to the source. The knock-on events can be 
a pool fire, jet fire, BLEVE etc. Further, the presence of obstacles along the 
pathway and the high degree of congestion on offshore platforms can lead to 
significant flame acceleration. Such increases in flame speed can in turn lead to 
significant overpressures and ultimately a partially confined or confined vapor 
cloud explosion. The effects of these escalation events are likely to be more 
severe than the flash fire itself. 
Consequence modeling of a cloud fire in an uncongested/ unconfined 
environment where overpressure is not a principal hazard has been well-
documented (Raj & Emmons, 1975, CCPS, 1994, Rew et al., 1995, 1998 and 
Cracknell & Carsley, 1997). These flash fire models are based on gas dispersion 
modeling coupled with the probability of ignition, where the boundary of the fire 
is defined by the unignited cloud's downwind and crosswind dimensions at 
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flammable limit concentrations (usually the lower flammable limit, LFL, of the 
cloud). An instantaneously released gas disperses and forms a cylindrical cloud 
of radius R as shown in the Figure 4.4. The modeling of the dispersing cloud 
formed by instantaneous fuel release has been described earlier in Section 3.2.1. 
···················•···••••··· 
Figure 4.4. Flame geometry of a vapor cloud that 
burns as flash fire 
4.4.1 FLASH FIRE MODEL 
Flash fire is a transient event which may last for less than a minute 
depending on the size of the cloud and external conditions. When the vapor 
cloud is ignited at one end as shown in Figure 4.4, it burns rapidly like a wall of 
flame until the cloud is completely burned. The height of the flame is assumed 
constant through out the combustion process as the depth of the cloud is taken to 
remain the same within the cloud. However, width of the flame increases in the 
initial stage, reaches a maximum and then decreases. These are the main 
parameters which define the characteristics of a fire. The correlations for these 
and additional parameters like flame speed, burn time etc. are as follows: 
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i) Flame Height 
Radiation effects from a flash fire can be determined if the geometry of the 
flame front is known. The height of the flame is given as, 
[ 2 ( J 2 ]1/3 H = 20d §__ Po wr 3 gd Pa (1-w) (4.42) 
w= ¢-t/Jst (1 r~. ) r/J > r/Jst a -'rst (4.43) 
(4.44) 
where, H is visible flame height, d is cloud depth, S is cloud burning speed, p 0 
is fuel-air mixture density, Pa is the density of air, r is stiochiometric mixture air-
fuel mass ratio, a is constant pressure expansion ratio for stoichiometric 
combustion (typically 8 for hydrocarbons), rjJ is fuel-air mixture composition 
(fuel volume ratio) and ¢sr is the stoichiometric mixture composition (fuel 
volume ratio). 
ii) Flame Width: 
The variation in the width of the flame with time is given as, 
(4.45) 
where, R is the cloud radius, tis the time and W is the flame width. 
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iii) Flame speed 
The flame speeds for natural gas and propane are obtained empirically 
and are quoted as 6 m/s and 12 m/s respectively (Cracknell & Carsley, 1997). 
After few experimental observations, Raj and Emmons(1975) found that burning 
speed was roughly proportional to ambient wind speed u and proposed an 
equation: 
S = 2.3xu (4.46) 
However, the most widely used formula for flame speed is the one 
developed as a function of turbulent burning velocity and the expansion ratio of 
the gases, given as: 
(4.47) 
where, E is the expansion ratio and U1 is the turbulent burning velocity. 
Empirically determined values for these parameters can be obtained from the 
literature for variety of gases (Lees, 1996). 
iv) Flame buming period: 
Following the determination of flame speed, flame burning period 
estimation becomes rather simple, given as, 
D 
t=-
s 
(4.48) 
where, D is the diameter of the cloud and S is cloud burning speed. 
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4.4.2 THERMAL RADIATION MODEL 
i) Surface Emissive Power 
From the Coyote and Maplin tests (HSE, 2001), a surface emissive power 
of 220 kw I m 2 has been obtained for propane and LNG flash fires. This value is 
considered to be a reasonable estimate when compared with other test results. 
ii) Radiation Heat flux 
The radiation heat flux incident on a target is evaluated in a similar way 
as for previous fire models by the product of atmospheric transmissivity ( r ), 
geometric view factor (VF) and the surface emissive power (SEP): 
q = VF x SEP x 'L (4.49) 
Surface emissive powers measured experimentally by Coyote and Maplin 
tests (HSE, 2001) are used, while view factors and transmissivity are evaluated 
using the correlations described in the Section 4.1.2. 
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4.5. SMOKE AND TOXICITY EFFECTS 
In most offshore fires, the main effects are due to heat radiation, but in a 
few events the effect of smoke has been significant, and these events have 
resulted in many fatalities (e.g. Piper Alpha). The Cullen report (Cullen, 1990) 
following this incident recommended the operators to carry out four key studies, 
assessment of smoke generation, its ingress into the accommodation block and 
subsequent effects was one among them. Therefore it is necessary to study the 
effects of smoke and toxic combustion gases on the personnel in order to 
complete a comprehensive consequence study. 
Smoke is generated by burning any hydrocarbon, gases or liquids, but in 
an offshore scenario, a significant amount is produced by burning liquids such as 
crude oil. Hence, pool fires and crude oil jet fires are considered to be the main 
sources for smoke generation. However, gas fires hold a minor contribution. 
Combustion gases consist mainly of a mixture of nitrogen, carbon dioxide, 
carbon monoxide and water vapor. Because of the high proportion of nitrogen in 
air, hot nitrogen tends to dominate in the combustion products. The 
concentration of toxic gases in the smoke is important because of their potential 
impact on personnel. For modeling purposes, it is necessary to know the initial 
concentration close to the fire. This task can be fulfilled by using basic 
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stiochiometric formulae. For example, the stochiometric ratio for most 
hydrocarbon fuels for combustion is 15 kg air per kg of fuel. Thus, in well 
ventilated fires with sufficient air for complete combustion, the smoke 
production rate is 16 times the fuel burning rate (Spouge, 1999). 
Meanwhile, CO is generated due to incomplete combustion of gases, 
which in turn is due to reduced ventilation (insufficient supply of air). There are 
few experimental results available (Spouge, 1999) for CO and C02 concentration, 
but they are very uncertain and cannot be universally considered for all cases. 
However, the values depicted in Table 4.1 can be used as guidance in 
consequence studies. Traces of other toxic gas like HCN, H2S etc are also released 
during combustion. However, they are not considered within this study. 
Table 4.1. Initial Gas Concentrations in Smoke (Spouge, 1997) 
CONCENTRATION IN SMOKE (vol 0/o) 
GAS WELL VENTILATED FIRE UNDER VENTILATED FIRE 
GAS FIRE LIQUID FIRE GAS FIRE LIQUID FIRE 
co 0.04 0.08 3 3.1 
C02 10.9 11.8 8.2 9.2 
With the concentration of main toxic gases in smoke e.g. CO, C02 known, 
concentration at any downwind distance can be determined by using a gas 
dispersion model such as a Pascal Gifford plume model discussed in Section 
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3.2.2. Thus, the effects of smoke and toxic gases on the personnel can be 
evaluated. The proportions of products in smoke for lkg of heavy oil are 
illustrated in Figure 4.5. These estimates can guide the assessment of the 
consequences of smoke exposure. 
AIR 
M= 15 kg 
T = 293 K 
p = 1.19 kg/m3 
V = 12.6 m3 
COMB. GASES 
M = 15.9 kg 
T = 873 K 
p = 0.4 kg/m3 
V =40m3 
SMOKE 
M = 16 kg 
T = 873 K 
p = 0.4 kg/m3 
V =40m3 
FUEL 
M= 1 kg 
T = 293 K 
p = 800 kg/m3 
V = 0.001 m 3 
SOOT 
M=0.1 kg 
T = 873 K 
p = 2250 kg/m3 
V = 4e-5 m 3 
Figure 4.5. Smoke production per kg of Heavy oil 
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4.6. FIRE OVERPRESSURE MODEL 
The importance of overpressure caused due to the fires, when occurring in 
a confined or semi-confined space has been highlighted by Wighus (1994). 
However, there appears to be no attempt to quantify this phenomenon. 
Therefore, a model has been developed to investigate the overpressure effects 
from the fires caused by the highly energized combustion gases released in a 
congested and confined compartment. This model has been developed by 
utilizing the ideal gas law and radiative heat transfer equations with the 
following assumptions. 
a) negligible convective heat transfer, 
b) ideal gas behavior of the combustion gases, 
c) small compartment openings, and 
d) linear distribution of temperature variation within the defined space. 
As mentioned before, the purpose of formulating this model was to 
investigate the possibility of blast effects from fires on personnel, equipment and 
the platform structure. The model can further be used to study the characteristics 
of external fires by estimating parameters such as the amount of unburned gases 
released from a vent and its corresponding release rate (from the predicted 
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overpressure), and to verify the design of vents, module sizes and a combination 
of these in terms of tolerable overpressures. 
The algorithm for overpressure calculation is as follows: 
1. Calculate the flame temperature, TJLame, using the correlation for radiation 
heat transfer as (assuming black body): 
(4.50) 
2. Similarly calculate the temperature at one corner of the compartment, Tee, 
and using assumption (d) mentioned earlier, estimate the average 
temperature of the gases, Tgases: 
T flame+ Tee 
Tgases = 2 
(4.51) 
3. Finally, use the ideal gas law to estimate an approximate value of the 
overpressure, Po, generated by the gases in the compartment: 
nRTgases 
Po=---=---
Vroom 
(4.52) 
where SEP is the surface emissive power (heat emitted by the flame per unit 
area), a is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.669*10-8 W /m2K4), To is the initial 
compartment temperature, n is the moles of combustion gases in the 
compartment, R is the gas constant, and Vroom is the volume of the compartment 
under study. 
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4.7. HUMAN IMPACT MODELS 
The consequences of fires and explosions are usually expressed in terms 
of thermal radiation intensity; smoke concentrations and explosion over 
pressures received by the personnel, equipment or structure. In order to estimate 
risk, it is useful to convert these effects into impacts causing damage. Dose 
response evaluation is used to quantify the damage (fatality) from thermal 
radiation and overpressure. To facilitate this analysis, personnel harm is 
expressed in terms of probit functions (Khan & Abbasi, 1998), which relate the 
percentage of people affected in a bounded region of interest by a normal 
distribution function. 
4.7.1 RADIATION PROBIT EQUATIONS 
The probability of death from radiation heat flux or overpressures 
received by human beings can be computed from the well defined probit 
relations. For the likelihood of fatality from heat radiation, the probit function 
(Lees, 1996) is given as, 
Pr = -36.38 + 2.56ln( tq 41 3 ) (4.53) 
where q is the radiation heat flux and tis the time of exposure. 
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4.7.2 TOXICITY PROBIT EQUATIONS 
The probit function for likelihood of death due to toxic load caused by 
inhalation of toxic gases like CO, C02 etc, (Lees, 1996) is given as 
(4.54) 
Where a, b, n are constants and Cis the gas concentration in mg/m3 • The values 
of constants vary with the toxic gases. E.g. for CO a=1, b=-7.4 and n=1 (Lees, 
1996). 
Finally the probability (percentage), P, of damage is correlated with the 
probit values obtained from the above mentioned equations in a way given as 
(CCPS, 2000): 
p = 50~1 + Pr- 5 erf(IPr- 5l)l l IPr-51 J2 (4.55) 
where erf is the error function. 
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Chapter 5 
EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCE MODELING 
This chapter provides an overview of explosion consequence modeling 
for gas explosions and boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions. A 
comprehensive literature review carried out related to each explosion 
consequence model has been discussed in their respective sections. A new 
probabilistic model developed to analyze the impact of missile on the process 
area and the people is also discussed. 
Reviewing the predictive models for analyzing the blast consequences 
from gas explosions, it was found that there are several models available, 
varying from simple empirical models to complex fluid dynamic models. These 
models are categorized as follows: 
i) Empirical models: These models have a limited range of applicability, cannot 
deal with complex geometries and have simplified the physics considerably. 
Nevertheless, these methods are useful for quick order-of-magnitude 
calculations and for screening of scenarios for further investigation with more 
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sophisticated tools. Some of the empirical models are TNO Multi-energy 
model (Van den Berg, et al. 1997, 2000), Baker Strehlow model (Baker et al. 
1998,2000, 2004), (CAM 2) Congestion Assessment method 2 (Puttock, 1999). 
ii) Phenomenological models: These models are slightly more complex than the 
empirical models and have a less limited range of applicability than them. 
These are essentially differential and algebraic equations, which are 
developed in a way to understand the physical process involved in gas 
explosions. Wherever necessary, the equations are fitted to rexperimental data 
to obtain the unknown parameters and are found to have a lower level of 
uncertainty than empirical models. The models are relatively easy to use, 
with modest computational requirements and therefore are suitable for use 
where large numbers of calculation runs are required. Examples of this type 
of model include SCOPE (Shell Code for Over-pressure Prediction in gas 
Explosions) (Puttock et. al. 2000), CLICHE (Confined linked CHamber 
Explosion) (Catlin, 1990) 
iii) Computational Fluid Dynamic models: CFD models are based on numerical 
solutions of the Navier-Stokes equations of fluid flow (i.e. a description of the 
conservation of mass, momentum and scalar quantities in flowing fluid, by 
means of a set of partial differential equations). Compared to the 
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phenomenological and empirical models, CFD offers the prospect of greater 
accuracy and flexibility, however computational run times are long and the 
scope for errors is greater. Examples of this type of model include FLACS, 
EXSIM, AUTOREAGAS, CFX, COBRA, Imperial College code (Lea et al. 
2002). 
After reviewing these models empirical models and phenomenological 
models were found to be appropriate for the current study. These models are 
easy to use, have short run times and are well suitable for being embedded in a 
quantitative risk assessment toolkit. As identified earlier, the explosions that 
commonly occur on offshore platforms are categorized as gas explosions 
(partially confined gas explosion, confined gas explosion and vented explosion) 
and Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions. In the subsequent sections, 
literature review carried out for individual explosion models has been provided 
followed by the description of modeling details of the selected ones. 
5.1. GAS EXPLOSIONS 
A gas explosion is a sudden generation and expansion of gases due to 
rapid burning of a flammable mass. The level of congestion and confinement in 
the area covered by the gas cloud usually characterizes a gas explosion. High 
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congestion in the form of obstacles causes the turbulence level in the flow to 
increase the fluid flow past the objects, resulting in increased flame acceleration, 
and overpressures. Gas explosions are further divided into two categories, which 
are described as follows. 
5.1.1 UNCONFINED/PARTIALLY CONFINED EXPLOSIONS 
Partially confined and highly congested conditions are typical of the 
process area of an FPSO (Floating Production Storage and Offloading) vessel and 
some offshore modules. Ignition of any vapor cloud under such conditions will 
lead to an explosion referred to as a partially confined explosion. In this case, 
overpressure generation is mainly due to turbulence generated by the obstacles, 
such as process equipment in the path of the expanding gas. Available empirical 
models can be used for modeling this kind of explosion as they have been tested 
and validated for partially confined and highly congested conditions. A review 
of all the empirical models and their comparison with experimental data has 
been presented by Fitzgerald (2001). It was recommended that Congestion 
Assessment Method (Puttock, 1999) could be used if one wants to study a worst-
case scenario and TNO Multi-energy model (Van den Berg, et al. 1997, 2000) if 
one wants to predict the average result for a set of explosion conditions. The 
former was chosen for explosion analysis in the present study. 
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The Congestion Assessment method comprises of two main steps for 
analyzing the consequences of gas explosions: 
• Determination of the source overpressure and 
• Dissipation of the obtained overpressure over a predefined area so that 
pressure experienced at various distances from the explosion center can be 
estimated. 
i) Source Overpressure estimation 
A correlation has been derived for estimating the source overpressure 
from a series of experimental tests in a gas-filled region of congestion comprising 
regular rows of cylinders with a central ignition source. The region is of length 
and width of 2L, and height L. To reach the open space the flame passes a 
number of similar grids in each direction. The correlation was developed in such 
a way that explosion overpressure is dependent on parameters such as type of 
fuel, number of rows of obstacles in each direction, area blockage ratio, obstacle 
diameter, spacing between the rows of obstacles etc, and is given as: 
(5.1) 
where, ao, a1, a2, a3 are constants (determined from experimental measurements), 
Uo is the laminar burning velocity, E is the expansion ratio Pu , Pu is unburned 
Pb 
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gas density, Pb burned gas density, n is the number of rows of obstacles in each 
direction counting from the centre, b is the blockage of rows of obstacles. 
However, with the increased congestion i.e. more rows of obstacles, the 
expression predicts very high overpressures (>10bars) which is beyond reality, as 
the experimental results (Fitzgerald, 2001) showed pressures no more than 8 
bars. Therefore a new parameter has been introduced, called the Severity Index 
(SI) and used instead of overpressure (P) in the previous correlation. The 
expression is similar to equation (5.1), given as. 
Severity index is in turn correlated with overpressure as shown in Figure 
5.1, so that explosion overpressure is close to 8 bars for any degree of congestion. 
1000 
100 
K 
0 
"0 
·= 0 
··c: 
0 
> 10 
'l> 
r;l) 
10 
Overpre:"csure, bar 
Figure 5.1. Severity Index and Overpressure relationship (Puttock, 1999) 
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It is clear that Severity index is equal to pressure at low overpressure, but 
increases rapidly as an overpressure of just over 8 bars is approached. By making 
an accurate curve fit, correlation in equation (5.3) was obtained, which is a 
nonlinear algebraic equation and has to be solved iteratively to obtain source 
overpressure P. 
SI = Pexp(o.4 1_08 P ) E -1-P (5.3) 
ii) Overpressure estimation at a receiver 
A receiver distance ~r' from the center of the cloud is the sum of the 
distance from the edge of the cloud to the cloud radius, given as, 
r = R0 + r' (5.4) 
(5.5) 
where, Ro is the radius of the cloud and r' is the distance from the edge of the 
cloud to the receiver and Vo is the volume of the gas cloud. 
Thus, pressure at the receiver is, 
. (Ro ) Preceiver = mzn ---;- P, P1 (5.6) 
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where P1 is a parameter given as, 
4 4 2 log P1 = 0.08lr -0.592lr + 1.63lr -3.28lr + 1.39 (5.7) 
r lr = log-+0.2 -0.02P0 
Ro 
(5.8) 
With the help of these correlations the source overpressure and the overpressure 
at the point of interest can be evaluated. 
5.1.2 CONFINED AND VENTED/EXTERNAL EXPLOSIONS 
Confined explosions, or confined vapor cloud explosions, usually occur in 
a largely confined space, such as inside enclosed modules, or in an oil tank, or a 
leg of a concrete platform. Overpressure is usually created by the expansion of 
gas in a confined volume as it burns and exceeds the vent capacity of the space. 
The presence of obstacles in the path will further enhance the overpressure 
generation and destruction. The phenomenological models SCOPE (Shell Code 
for Overpressure Prediction in gas Explosions) and CLICHE (Confined Linked 
CHamber Explosion) were specially developed for confined explosions in 
offshore modules. SCOPE 3, the most recent version of SCOPE, was selected for 
the present study due to its capability of handling mixed scale objects, rear 
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venting, and an improved combustion m~del. It has been validated against more 
than 300 experiments. 
Vented/External explosion occ urs in conjunction with confined 
explosions. During a confined explosio~ unburned gas is released through the 
vents. On ignition, the release will leacl to an external/vented explosion. The 
consequence modeling of external explos ions is usually combined with confined 
explosions. SCOPE 3 handles vented ex:~~losions as well. Similar to the explosion 
model described in section 5.1.1, this model also has similar steps, source 
overpressure prediction and overpressu_re dissipation. However, the modeling 
approaches are different, as explained in the details as follows: 
i) Source overpressure estimation 
The explosion geometry (an offsh10re compartment) is approximated by a 
box of length L, width W, height Hand cross-sectional area A with the obstacles 
represented in the form of shadings (Figure 5.2). At one end of the box is the 
main vent of area Av. Ignition occurs at the centre of the face opposite to the 
explosion vent, which corresponds to the worst possible case. The flame is 
assumed to be hemispherical until it reaches the walls of the box, at which point 
it ceases to increase in size and prop agates along the box with a roughly 
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hemispherical shape. In order to correctly predict the relationship between 
pressure generation and vent flow, the model records two variables with time, 
the amounts of burnt and unburned gas inside the box. 
! 
I 
w 
i : i '_ 
~-----------------------!:--------------------------~ 
Figure 5.2. Geometry of an offshore module with obstacles 
The equations for mass of burnt and unburned gases are: 
(5.9) 
(5.10) 
where M u is the mass of unburned gas inside the box, sA is the flame area , co is 
the vent discharge coefficient, Uv is the velocity of the unburned gas through the 
vent, Pis the pressure inside the box, and E is the expansion ratio. 
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The parameter B is given by the following expression, 
(5.11) 
where, Vb is the volume of burnt gas inside the box. The pressure and flame 
position is determined by the quantity of burnt and unburned gas in the box. It is 
also possible to keep track of the mass of gas emitted Me from the main vent that 
can be used later for external explosion calculations: 
(5.12) 
All the parameters like turbulent burning velocity, laminar burning 
velocity, expansion ratio, grid effects (sharp edged obstacles), obstacle 
complexity, vent flow (main, side, rear vents) are obtained empirically or semi-
empirically (Puttock et. al. 2000). 
Vented/ external explosion overpressure is correlated empirically with 
the pressure, when flame has covered 70°/o of the distance in the compartment 
given as, 
pext = 3. 75 Av 
( ]
0.85 
Po.7 y21 3 (5.13) 
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Therefore the maximum source overpressure is a relation between 
emerging pressure (pressure when flame reaches the vent) and the external 
pressure as: 
P max = Pemerg + 0. 7 Pext (5.14) 
This is the maximum source pressure generated due to gas explosion in a 
compartment. 
ii) Overpressure estimation at a receiver 
Pressure at the receiver (overpressure dissipation) can be obtained in a 
similar fashion as described in Section 5.1.1. 
5.2. BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOR EXPLOSION (BLEVE) 
When a fire such as a pool or jet fire impinges on a vessel containing 
pressure-liquefied gas, liquid vaporizes and expands, raises the pressure in the 
vessel and weakens the vessel walL This phenomenon can eventually cause a 
catastrophic failure of the vessel with the release of the entire inventory, which is 
called a BLEVE. There are empirical models (CCPS, 1994 and Lees, 1996) as well 
as dynamic response simulation codes (Salzano et al., 2003) for peak 
overpressure prediction. The procedure for predicting the blast effects from 
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BLEVE has been well addressed in CCPS (1994) and was employed in the current 
study. A description of the procedure follows. 
i) Collection of data: 
Data of some necessary parameters such as the vessel failure pressure, 
ambient pressure, volume of the vessel, liquid fill ratio and shape of the vessel 
have to be collected. These parameters are utilized while performing 
thermodynamic calculations to estimate the explosion energy. 
ii) Calculation of explosion energy 
The specific initial energy of superheated liquid stored in a vessel is 
determined using thermodynamic calculations in which it is obtained by the 
difference between the internal energies of the initial and expanded states of the 
fluid. The total explosion energy is then obtained by multiplying the specific 
initial energy by the mass of fluid released, 
(5.15) 
where, u1 is the specific internal energy of the fluid in the initial state, u 2 is the 
specific internal energy in the expanded state and m1 is the mass of fluid 
released. 
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iii) Calculation of non-dimensional distance ( R ) 
The correlation used to calculate the non-dimensional distance of the 
target, R is given as, 
(5.16) 
where, r is the distance at which blast parameters are to be determined and Pa is 
the ambient pressure. 
iv) Determination of non-dimensional overpressure ( Pr) 
Using the parameter R and the plot for "Non-dimensional overpressure 
versus non-dimensional distance for overpressure calculations" (Figure 6.21 of 
CCPS, 1994), non-dimensional overpressure Pr corresponding to R is calculated. 
v) Adjustment of non-dimensional overpressure ( Pr) for geometric effects: 
This procedure produces blast parameters applicable to a completely 
symmetrical blast wave, such as that would result from the explosion of a 
hemispherical vessel placed directly on the ground. In practice, vessels are either 
spherical or cylindrical and placed at some height above the ground. This 
influences blast parameters. To adjust for these geometry effects, Pr should be 
multiplied by some adjustment factors derived from experiments with high 
90 
Chapter 5. Explosion Consequence modeling 
explosive charges of various shapes. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 give multipliers for 
adjusting scaled values for cylindrical vessel of various R and for spheres 
elevated slightly above the ground, respectively. 
Table 5.1. Adjustment factors for Pr for cylindrical vessels of various R 
(CCPS, 1994) 
Non-dimensional distance R Multiplier for Pr 
<0.3 4 
'?:. 0.3 ~ 1.6 1.6 
>1.6~3.5 1.6 
>3.5 1.4 
Table 5.2. Adjustment factors for spherical vessels slightly elevated above 
ground (CCPS, 1994) 
Non-dimensional distance R Multiplier for Pr 
<1 2 
>1 1.1 
vi) Calculation of actual overpressure: 
The adjusted value of non-dimensional overpressure Pr is then 
transformed to actual overpressure using the following correlation. 
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(5.17) 
where, Pr is the adjusted non-dimensional overpressure at the target and Pr is 
the actual pressure. This procedure allows calculating the overpressures at 
various target distances. 
Other types of explosions that are not dealt within this study include 
physical explosions (caused by excess pressure in a vessel), internal explosions 
(within a flare stack), mist explosions and solid phase explosions (e.g. associated 
with the use of well completion explosives). The modeling of internal explosions, 
mist explosions, and solid phase explosions is not well understood and needs 
further research efforts. 
5.3. MISSILE IMPACT ANALYSIS- A PROBABILISTIC MODEL 
This section focuses on the probabilistic model developed to analyze the 
missile impacts on the people and the process area. The model quantifies the 
probability of a missile strike at an object and hence can aid in assessing the 
possible chances of escalation of accidental events. The details of the 
methodology are presented in the following sections. 
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5.3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The total energy released during a physical explosion or a BLEVE is 
shared for overpressure and fragment generation. The fraction of energy 
imparted to the fragments by the blast wave causes the fragments to become air 
borne and act as missiles. They can cause direct injuries to the people or can 
damage the structures. Missile effects are considered to be a serious issue in the 
safety of process plants. Some of the recent explosion incidents occurred in 
Haltern, Germany in 1976, Texas City in 1978 and Mexico City in 1984 (CCPS, 
1994). These incidents are disastrous and involved the effects of missiles causing 
vast damage to the personnel and the plant. 
The main concern with missiles lies in its capability of enhancing the 
accident effects (or enabling escalation in the accident events), a phenomenon 
often referred as domino effect. Earlier, Khan and Abbasi (2001) worked on the 
issue of quantifying the probability of domino effect. They developed a computer 
automated tool, known as DOMIFFECT that does the necessary probabilistic 
calculations and embedded it in their consequence analysis toolkit MAXCRED. 
The possibility of escalation arises when missiles strike equipment located 
in the vicinity with impact energy greater than the strength of the vessel. It 
should be noted that not all the missiles are involved in the process of collision. 
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In fact, there are no deterministic models available that can predict which 
missiles can collide with an object. Hence, the overall analysis is to be considered 
as probabilistic. The impact energy that causes an escalation is, therefore, defined 
as the product of uprobability of a missile striking a vessel" and uthe impact 
energy should it strike". There are correlations available in the literature to 
determine the impact energies (Lees, 1996) that are based on missile 
characteristics such as mass, shape and its velocity. However, there seems to be 
comparatively little work done in the area of quantifying the probability of strike 
from missiles. 
Recently, Hauptmmans (2001) developed a procedure for analyzing the 
flight of missiles ejecting from bursts of spherical and cylindrical vessels by 
making use of Monte Carlo simulation technique. The calculations for estimating 
the probability of a missile hitting an individual in the surroundings were 
performed and the results were plotted as contours around the exploding vessel. 
However, no attempt was made to demonstrate the actual mathematical 
formulation. Earlier, Scilly and Crowther (1992) proposed a methodology for 
assessing the risk of missile impact on a process plant that involved the 
estimation of probability of a strike from the missiles for a given target close to 
the explosion source. The only scenario considered in their approach was that 
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umissiles strike an object only when they fall in a predefined area whose length 
dimension (range) is called effective range interval". 
Emphasis is given only on the missiles ejecting from the burst of a 
cylindrical vessel placed horizontally on ground. Cases involving spherical 
vessels and vertical cylinders are not considered for time being. While 
formulating the methodology, two credible scenarios are taken into account. 
They are: Any object in the vicinity of explosion source gets struck by the 
missiles, 
• When the missiles fall within the defined Vulnerable Area (VA) or 
• When the missiles collide with the target before reaching their final 
destination (a distance father than the vulnerable area). 
Probabilities of strike from these two scenarios are analyzed and 
combined together to put forth the overall probability of strike. During the 
process of probabilistic analysis, a Monte Carlo simulation technique has been 
employed to perform simulation experiments for representing the parameters of 
interest as statistical distributions. 
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5.3.2. METHODOLOGY FOR PROBABILITY OF STRIKE 
The methodology for quantifying the probability of a strike from the 
missiles for a given target is based on the fact that any object in the vicinity of an 
explosion source has two possibilities for a missile strike. They are: 
• When the missiles travel a distance exactly equal to that of an object and 
falls on the object or 
• When the missiles collide with the object on its way before reaching its 
final destination, a distance farther than the object. 
However, to be more conservative, instead of referring the strike due to 
missiles falling exactly on the object, it can be said that a missile strike is possible 
when the missiles reach an area where the object is placed. This area is termed as 
the Vulnerable Area (VA), which is representative of danger to the object from 
the missiles, should they reach it. 
Consider a case where a cylindrical storage vessel placed horizontally on 
the ground is the explosion/ missile source and a spherical storage vessel is the 
target object placed in the neighborhood of the source. A top view of this 
particular scenario has been represented in Figure 5.3. The dotted circular area 
around the spherical target is the Vulnerable Area (VA). Any fragment falling in 
this area would possibly have chances of striking the target. The obvious 
question that arises is nHow do we define this area?" It can be defined by 
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assuming that the vulnerable area takes the shape of the target object and has a 
diameter ix' times that of the target, where ix' is subject to variation and depends 
on how conservative one wants to be in ones missile risk calculations. Any value 
in between 1 to 1.5 should be conservative for a spherical target. 
With this background, the two possibilities mentioned earlier are 
modified. Instead of considering missiles falling on the object, missiles reaching 
the VA are given primary importance. For the new scenarios, a missile strike can 
be expected. 
1. When missiles reach the VA, or 
2. When missiles collide with the object before reaching its final destination, 
a distance beyond the VA. 
)-.x TOP VIEW 
y 
Y-axis 
X-axis 
Figure 5.3. Top view of the source, target scenario 
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Scenario 1: While analyzing the missiles reaching the VA, two new terms are 
defined called Effective Range Interval (ERI) and Effective Orientation Interval 
(EOI). ERI is the diameter of the vulnerable area and EOI is the angle between 
the two tangents drawn to either sides of the VA from the center of the source as 
shown in Figure 5.3. After defining these two parameters, it can be said that 
missiles fall in the vulnerable area, when they fall within the ERI, provided they 
orient within the EOL It should be noted that these two parameters dictate the 
dimensions of the vulnerable area. 
For computational purposes, mathematical formulae have been provided 
to estimate ERI and EOL From Figure 5.3, AC = R is the distance between source 
and the target object, LBAX = B is the orientation of the target object with 
respect to explosion source. BD = L1R is the Effective Range Interval (ERI) 
and LEAF = L1B is the Effective Orientation Interval (EOI). 
The parameters L1R and L1B are estimated with the following equations, 
~28 = (; -tan-J(~~)J 
M=2*(; -tan-t:12 )J 
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Where, D 1 is the diameter of the spherical target object, R is the distance between 
the source and the target object and x as mentioned before is any value within 1-
1.5. A conservative value of 1.5 has been chosen here. 
Probabilistic analysis for scenario 1: Probability of strike due to fragments 
falling within the vulnerable area is given by the product of "'probability of 
fragments falling within the ERI or.&?." and "'probability of fragments orienting 
within the EOI or LiB ". 
i) The probability of fragments falling within the ERI is then given by the 
difference between the cumulative probabilities for the fragments 
reaching a distance R +0.5.&?. and those reaching R -0.5.&?. as, 
P( .&?. ) = P( r < ( R +0.5.&?. ))- P( r < ( R -0.5.&?. )) (5.21) 
ii) The probability of fragments orienting within the EOI is given by the 
difference between the cumulative probabilities for the fragments 
orienting at an angle B+0.5L1B and those orientating at B-0.5L1Bas, 
P( LiB)= P(B<(B+0.5L1B ))-P(B<(B-0.5L1B )) 
Thus, the probability of a strike from this scenario 1 is, 
P1( strike)= P( .&?. )x P( LiB) 
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Figure 5.4. Front view of the source, target scenario 
Scenario 2: While analyzing the missiles colliding with the object before reaching 
their final destination, another term is introduced called as Effective Trajectory 
Interval (ETI), where ETI is defined as the angle between the horizontal and the 
tangent, drawn from the center of the source to the top of the VA, shown as a 
dotted line in Figure 5.4 and given by L1 f • However, to simply the calculations 
for evaluation of ETI, the solid line is taken as a basis instead of the dotted line. It 
should be noted that Figure 5.4 represents the front view of the same source 
target scenario shown in Figure 5.3. Similar to the previous scenario, VA is the 
dotted circular area around the target object. Missiles traveling with an angle of 
trajectory less than or equal to the ETI would pass through the VA, provided 
they orient within the EOI and posses enough initial momentum that can drive 
them beyond the VA. Only these missiles pose danger to the target object. 
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From Figure 5.4, LKAoC = Lly is the Effective Trajectory Interval (ETI). For 
computational purposes, Lly is estimated as: 
KC 
tan( Lly )=-
AC 
For L1R = 1.5Dt, Lly is given ens, 
A -J(( Dt 14 )+Dt) LJY =tan 
R 
where Dr is the diameter of t1he spherical target object. 
(5.24) 
(5.25) 
(5.26) 
Probabilistic analysis for sc enario 2: Probability of a strike due to collision of 
fragments with the target b~fore reaching their final destination is given by the 
product of "probability of fragments falling beyond the ERI or L1R" and 
"probability of fragments ori.enting within the EOI or L10 " and the "probability 
of them flying within the ETI or Lly ". 
i) The probability of frag;rnents falling beyond the ERI is given as: 
P( L1R') = 1-P{ r<( R+0.5L1R)) (5.27) 
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ii) The probability of fragments orienting within the EOI is, 
P( L1B) = P( B <( B+0.5L1B ))- P( B <( B-0.5L1B )) (5.28) 
iii) The probability of fragments flying within the ETI is given as, 
P( L1 y ) = P( y < ( L1 y ) ) 
Thus, the probability of strike from this scenario 2 is, 
P2 ( strike)= P( LlR' )x P( L1B )x P( Lly) 
Overall probability of strike 
(5.29) 
(5.30) 
The overall probability of strike depends on both the scenarios defined 
above. They being independent events, union of probabilities of scenariol and 
scenario2 is eventually the sum of their probabilities (equations 5.23, 5.30), given 
as, 
P( strike ) = P1 ( strike ) + P2 ( strike ) (5.31) 
From these probabilistic formulations it is evident that there is a necessity 
for cumulative distribution functions for range, orientation and trajectory of the 
fragments, which can be obtained by representing each of the parameters by 
statistical distributions, the details of which are discussed in the following 
section. 
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5.3.3. PROBABILISTIC MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF MISSILE IMPACT 
The analysis carried out by Baker et al. (1978) on 25 accidental vessel 
explosions for mass and range distribution was considered to be the most 
complete statistical analysis in the open literature to date. As a result, log normal 
distributions were proposed for both mass and range of the fragments. However, 
there was no attempt to study the statistical characteristics of orientation and 
trajectories of the missiles. Also, there was not much emphasis on the shapes of 
the vessels involved in explosions. Although, accidents in cylindrical vessels 
were analyzed separately, they were not particular about whether these were 
placed horizontally or vertically. Therefore it may not be a sensible decision to 
follow the log normal distributions for mass and range of fragments universally 
for any vessel geometry. The focus of this work being on horizontal cylinders the 
distributions were re-evaluated based on simulation experiments carried out 
using a Monte Carlo simulation technique. The details of the input parameters 
for this approach are described below. 
i) Orientation of fragments 
The orientation of fragments when a large number of fragments is 
generated is not very well defined in the literature. The common assumption is 
that the fragments are projected uniformly in all directions. Alternatively, the 
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more conservative approach may be adopted in which the spatial density of the 
fragments is assumed to be greater in the direction of the vulnerable targets. 
Holden and Reeves (1985) analyzed 11 incidents involving 15 vessels containing 
mainly LPG. It was reported that about half of the fragments were projected into 
one third of the total area, in arcs of 30° to either side of the vessel's front and 
rear axial directions. Assuming the fragments are equally shared, 25°/oof 
fragments fall in each of the four regions corresponding to angles 345°-15°, 15°-
1650, 1650-1950, and 1950-3450 respectively. This information is good enough to 
formulate a statistical distribution for orientation of fragments. With 25°/o of the 
fragments falling in the smaller regions corresponding to angles 345°-15° and 
1650-195°, a higher probability of strike may be expected in these regions. 
ii) Angle of trajectory of fragments 
No deterministic models exist to predict the angle of trajectory in the case 
of bursting of a vessel into a large number of fragments. However, for horizontal 
cylinders, most of the fragments are expected to take a small initial angle of 
trajectory, usually between 0 to 100 degrees (CCPS, 1994). This is because of the 
higher probability of generation of end caps than any other missile shapes. To be 
on the conservative side, a range of 0-20° was assumed and has been distributed 
uniformly as there is no evidence of any particular distribution cited in the 
literature. 
104 
Chapter 5. Ex=plosion Consequence modeling 
iii) Range of fragments 
With the assumption of negligible fluid dynar::n.ic forces, the only force 
acting on the fragment is that of gravity. Therefore, the range of fragment is 
given as: 
R = vf sin(2yi) 
2g (5.32) 
where, v; is the initial fragment velocity and Y; L s the fragment angle of 
trajectory. 
While analyzing the fragments for their Sight (range), there are 
parameters that need to be understood and which a ::re often considered to be 
highly stochastic in nature. They are: energy of f:rragmentation, number of 
fragments generated, fragment shape, mass and energ;y distributions, wind and 
drag effects. These parameters have great influence o -n the flight of the missile 
and hence need extra attention. The stochastic natu:r::-e or uncertainty of these 
parameters can be taken care of by representing them as statistical distributions. 
The details are as follows. 
a. Energy for fragmentation 
The initial energy of superheated liquid stored_ in a vessel is determined 
by a procedure illustrated by CCPS (1994). This is o ased on thermodynamic 
105 
Chapter 5. Explosion Consequence modeling 
calculations in which the energy is obtained by the difference between the 
internal energies of the initial and expanded states of the fluid . 
Another important parameter is the fraction of total internal energy 
contributing to fragmentation. This energy is often referred to as kinetic energy 
since this is the energy which provides the initial momentum in the fragments 
turning them into missiles. From the experiments conducted by Baum (1984), the 
fraction translated to kinetic energy was found to be in between 0.2 to 0.5 of the 
total internal energy. It can be any value in the given range; therefore, the 
fraction is assumed being uniformly distributed with a constant probability 
density function. 
b. Number of fragments 
Baker et al. (1978) and Holden and Reeves (1985) discussed incidents 
involving 15 cylindrical vessels, the number of fragments resulted from which 
were then fitted by a log-normal distribution with a mean of 0.855 and a 
standard deviation of 0.525. By analyzing this statistical distribution, it was 
evident that there were chances of up to 20 fragments. However, in the case of 
BLEVE events, it was cited that the number of fragments are far fewer than 
mentioned above (CCPS, 1994). Any number between 2 to 10 is explainable. 
Therefore, besides using a log normal distribution, an option of employing a 
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right-sided triangular distribution was incorporated, with rrummum and 
maximum number of fragments of 2 and 10 respectively. 
c. Mass and Energy distribution of the fragments 
Using the experimental results of Baker et al. (1977), Hauptmanns (2001) 
has estimated the mass distribution of fragments to follow a Beta distribution 
with parameters a=0.412 and b=l.39. However, introducing additional uncertain 
input variables will increase the complexity involved in calculations, which may 
deviate the results away from reality. Therefore, the mass of all the fragments 
was assumed to be the same here, which in turn lead to an assumption of equal 
energy distribution among the fragments. 
d. Initial velocity of the fragments 
The initial velocity of the fragments is used to calculate either the range of 
fragment travel or the impact velocity, if fragments collide with an obstacle 
before attaining maximum range. A great deal of work has been carried out in 
this area and CCPS, 1994). The formulation proposed by CCPS (1994) for 
fragment initial velocity is based on the kinetic energy Eki imparted to a 
fragment and its mass, given as 
[ ]
0.5 
V; = 2:~i (5.33) 
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Where, vi is the initial fragment velocity, Eki is the kinetic energy imparted to the 
fragment and M i is mass of the fragment. As the mass of fragments is equally 
distributed, the velocity of each fragment remains the same. 
e. Statistical Distribution for Range 
A Monte Carlo simulation approach has been employed to conduct 
simulation experiments by making use of the equations, assumptions and 
considerations mentioned earlier. Each trial run is a simulation experiment. A 
large number of trial runs have been carried out for better convergence of the 
results. These experiments resulted in a set of data for the parameters of interest 
such as orientation, trajectory and range of fragments, which was further 
analyzed to obtain statistical distributions for each of them. 
Having obtained the statistical distributions for orientation, trajectory and 
range of missiles, the implementation of the methodology described in section 
5.3.2, for quantifying the probability of strike is straightforward. A case study 
considered to illustrate the capability of the proposed methodology has been 
discussed in chapter 7. 
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5.4. HUMAN IMP ACT MODELS 
The importance of human impact models was already discussed in section 
4.7. In a nutshell, these models convert the overpressure and missile effects into 
consequences to humans via estimation of percentage fatalities. The 
corresponding probit equations for overpressures and missile effects are given 
below. 
5.4.1. OVERPRESSURE PROBIT EQUATION 
The probit function for likelihood of death due to overpressure (lung 
rupture) caused by explosions (Lees, 1996) is given as 
Pr = -77.1 +6.91ln(P0 ) (5.34) 
where Po is the overpressure in Pa. 
5.4.2. MISSILE EFFECTS PRO BIT EQUATION 
The data obtained based on animal experiments (Lees, 1996) was analyzed 
and a probit equation was formulated for penetration of a missile (causing 
wounds). It is given as 
Pr = -8.35 +0.61ln(M f xu f) (5.35) 
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For fatal and serious injuries Gilbert, Lees and Scilly (1994) proposed a 
probit equation of the form 
Pr = -0.24 + 1.96ln(M 1 °.4 xu f) (5.36) 
where Mtis the mass of the fragment and UJiS the fragment velocity. 
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Chapter 6 
SIMULATION- GRID BASED APPROACH 
This chapter focuses on the computer code development for performing 
fire and explosion consequence analysis. A comparison of the models used in the 
present approach with that being used by existing software packages has been 
discussed. The use of grid based approach during the simulation process is 
highlighted within this chapter. 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Literature review of the existing fire and explosion consequence models 
and the selection of most suitable models for offshore conditions have been 
discussed so far in chapters 3, 4 and 5. In addition, a couple of new models such 
as a fire overpressure model and a probabilistic model for missile impact have 
been developed and discussed. A comparison of these models with the ones used 
by the existing software packages for fire and explosion consequence studies has 
been depicted in Table 6.1. It is evident from the table that most of the models 
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employed here are more advanced than the counterpart. This should produce 
enhancement in the results. 
Table 6.1. Models for fire and explosion consequence study used in existing 
software packages and in the current work 
FIRE USED IN EXISTING USED IN CURRENT S.No CONSEQUENCE SOFTWARE WORK MODELS PACKAGES 
1 RELEASE MODELS Empirical correlations Empirical correlations 
2 DISPERSION Empirical models Empirical models MODELS 
3 IGNITION MODEL COX model Enhanced onsi te Ignition model 
4 FIRE MODELS Point source State-of-the-art solid 
models I CFD codes flame models 
5 OVERPRESSURE N/A Model developed MODEL and used 
Neutrally buoyant Neutrally buoyant gas 6 SMOKE MODEL gas dispersion dispersion model 
model/CFD codes 
7 TOXICITY EFFECTS N/A Stoichiometric Mass MODEL (CO, C02) balance equations 
Empirical or State-of-the-art EXPLOSION Empirical and 8 Phenomenological MODELS Phenomenological 
models I CFD codes 
models 
RADIATION AND 
9 EXPLOSION Point/ area model Multipoint grid-DISSIPATION based model 
MODEL 
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Probabilistic model 
10 MISSILE EFFECTS Empirical model developed using MODEL Monte Carlo 
simulation 
11 HUMAN IMPACT Probit models Probit models MODELS 
6.2. SIMULATION USING GRID BASED APPROACH 
With the required consequence models and the simulation algorithms 
available in hand, computer codes were developed in MA TLAB 6 for simulating 
the fire and explosion consequence models. While simulating the models a 
sequence should be followed. For a fire consequence study the order of 
simulation of the models is shown in Figure 6.1 and for explosion consequence 
study it is shown in Figure 6.2. A grid-based modeling approach has been 
employed during this process which enables better modeling and analysis of 
radiation and overpressure impacts at different locations in the process area. 
During grid-based simulation, the process area under study as shown in Figure 
6.3 is divided into a specific number of grids, and the hazard potentials and 
consequences are then evaluated at each end of the grid, finally plotting the 
results as contours. 
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RELEASE MODEL 
+ 
DISPERSION MODEL I 
+ 
IGNITION MODEL 
+ 
FIRE MODEL 
+ 
RADIATION MODEL 
+ 
OVERPRESSURE 
MODEL 
+ 
SMOKE & TOXICITY 
MODELS 
+ 
HUMAN IMPACT 
MODEL 
+ 
GRID BASED 
APPROACH 
Figure 6.1. Simulation sequence of models for fire consequence study 
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RELEASE MODEL 
DISPERSION MODEL 
IGNITION MODEL 
EXPLOSION MODEL 
BLAST DISSIPATION 
MODEL 
HUMAN IMPACT 
MODEL 
GRID BASED 
APPROACH 
Figure 6.2. Simulation sequence of models for explosion consequence study 
Contour plotting is a more user-friendly representation than the ordinary 
line plots obtained by other software packages. A question that arises is "into 
how many grids should the space be divided?" After extensive trial runs to study 
the effect of number of grids on two factors: the precision of results for plotting, 
and the computational time, 50 x50 = 2500 grids turned out to be the optimal 
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setting that could ensure an optimal balance between precision and 
computational time. 
Figure 6.3. Plant layout that is divided into grids 
Additionally, the analysis of radiation heat and blast waves is uncertain if 
the presence of obstacles (partial barriers, e.g. process equipment and solid 
barriers e.g. Passive Fire Protection walls, explosion proof walls) is not taken into 
account. This issue does not arise when using CFD models, as application of 
appropriate boundary conditions will solve the problem. However, it appears to 
be difficult to resolve this issue while using semi-empirical models, unless a grid-
based approach is used. Also, the damage contours obtained by adopting a grid-
based approach permit the development of a clear picture of potential impact 
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zones. This can facilitate proper selection and specification of safe separation 
distances to prevent injury to people and damage to nearby equipment. 
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Chapter 7 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This chapter presents and discusses the results obtained by carrying out 
fire and explosion consequence analysis. Various fire and explosion scenarios 
occurring on an offshore platform were identified and simulated. The results 
obtained from this work were compared with that of commercial software 
packages and are elaborated here. Also discussed are the results of missile 
effects. 
7.1. OFFSHORE FIRES: CREDIBLE SCENARIOS 
In this section, various credible scenarios are studied for pool fires, jet fires 
and ,fireballs occurring in a 50 m x 50 m x 10 m compartment on an offshore 
platform. These scenarios are then simulated using the suite of models for fire 
consequence analysis discussed in chapter 2, in a sequential order. The 
consequences from radiation heat fluxes and overpressures generated by the 
combustion gases in the compartment were then analyzed. The simulation 
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results for each of the fires are presented graphically in two different ways: 
radiation heat flux contours and radiation damage (0/o fatality) contours. 
For flash fires, a separate scenario was identified, in which a flash fire 
occurs due to ignition of a vapor cloud formed over an imaginary process area 
(100x100 m 2) of a typical offshore platform. The radiation and fatality results are 
then plotted as contours over this area just to have a clear picture of safer zones 
and vulnerable zones. However, the obstacle effects on thermal radiation are not 
considered. 
Scenario 1: Pool Fire 
The liquid spill at a volumetric rate 0.04 m3 Is, from a storage tank 
containing 100-kg crude oil, placed in the center of a compartment forms a pool 
and catches fire, leading to a pool fire. Wind conditions are 5 m/s in the easterly 
direction. 
Simulation Results: 
Maximum pool diameter= 3.3 m 
Height of pool fire = 4.8 m 
Angle of tilt from vertical= 57 degrees 
Surface emissive power of lower clear flame= 105 kW /m2 
Surface emissive power of upper smoky flame= 24 kW /m2 
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Radiation Effects 
The steady state radiation heat flux in the compartment is represented by 
the contours shown in Figure 7.1. Similarly, lethality (radiation damage) contours 
in the same space are represented in Figure 7.2. As the pool fire is tilted 57 
degrees from the vertical toward the downwind direction, the radiation and 
hence the damage must be higher downwind than upwind. This is evident from 
the contours in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. These contours confirm that most of the 
compartment is prone to lethal effects. Safe areas are apparent from Figure 7.2 
and are located at corners of the compartment. 
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Figure 7.1. Radiation contours for the pool fire scenario 
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Fatality Contours 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Lenght of module (m) 
Figure 7.2. Lethality contours for the pool fire scenario 
Overpressure Effects: 
Overpressure generated from the hot combustion gases released during a 
pool fire in the compartment was calculated as 0.25 kPa, which has negligible 
impact. Possible effects are loud noise, sonic boom, glass failure and breakage of 
small windows under strain (CCPS, 2000). However, it must be remembered that 
this result is for a fuel loading of 100 kg. Larger fuel inventories, such as are 
routinely found on offshore installations, have the potential for generating higher 
overpressures. 
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Scenario 2: Horizontal Jet Fire 
A leak of 0.152-m diameter in a 100-m3 pressurized natural gas storage 
tank placed at one end of the compartment causes the inventory to exit as a 
horizontal jet at a rate of 11.2 kgls. The fuel ignites immediately after release and 
results in a horizontal jet fire. Wind conditions are 5 ml s in the easterly 
direction. 
Simulation Results: 
Burning time = 17 s 
Length of flame = 38 m 
Frustum length = 26 m 
Angle of tilt from vertical= 80 degrees 
Surface emissive power from sides of flame = 223 k WI m 2 
Surface emissive power from end of flame = 242 k WI m 2 
Radiation Effects: 
The steady state radiation heat flux in the compartment is represented by 
the contours in Figure 7.3. Although, the flame length is 38m, the burning time 
of 17 seconds reduces the amount of damage in the defined space. The lethality 
(radiation damage) contours are represented in the same area as shown in Figure 
7.4. The contours shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 are elliptical, as is expected from 
the initial and boundary conditions that define the physical scenario. This 
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confirmation facilitates the reliable prediction of consequences, which in turn 
provides an opportunity to identify safer zones for escape when an unwanted 
event occurs. The lethality contours illustrate that 100°/o lethality is predicted in 
most parts of the compartment. Safe zones in all directions are apparent from the 
lethality contours in Figure 7.4. 
Overpressure Effects: 
The overpressure generated by the combustion gases in the compartment 
was calculated to be 2.1 kPa. Limited minor structural damage and at times slight 
damage to window frames (CCPS, 2000) can occur due to this pressure. 
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Figure 7.3. Radiation contours for the horizontal jet fire scenario 
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Fatality contours 
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Figure 7.4. Lethality contours for the horizontal jet fire scenario 
Scenario 3: Fireball 
Fire impingement on a propane gas storage tank causes a pressure rise 
inside the tank and eventually leads to a BLEVE. A fuel mass of 1272 kg is 
released and ignited, resulting in a fireball. 
Simulation Results: 
Diameter of fireball = 66 m 
Time of existence of fireball = 7.9 s 
Height of fireball center above ground = 49.5 m 
Surface emissive power from the fireball= 320 kW /m2 
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Radiation Effects: 
The steady state radiation contours in the compartment are shown in 
Figure 7.5. Lethality (Radiation damage) contours are plotted on the same area as 
shown in Figure 7.6. Although the fireball lasts for only about 8 seconds, the 
large amount of fuel released results in -90 °/o lethality close to the fireball with 
minor damage persisting at all other areas of the compartment. No zones are 
identified as 100°/o safer. Therefore, fewer chances are available for escape in the 
event of such a fireball. 
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Figure 7.5. Radiation contours for the fireball scenario 
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Figure 7.6. Lethality contours for the fireball scenario 
Overpressure Effects 
The overpressure created by the fireball in the compartment was 
calculated as 2.4 kPa, again a value which is approaching the point at which 
personnel mobility is affected. The fact that the fireball overpressure is higher 
than that predicted for the pool fire (scenario 1) is explainable in part by the 
much higher mass of fuel released in the fireball scenario. 
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Scenario 4: Flash fire 
Two scenarios are considered within flash fires. They occur as a result of 
ignition of a propane gas cloud formed by instantaneous and continuous 
releases. The scenario details are as follows: 
i) An instantaneous release (IR) of 1000 kg of propane gas over the process 
area forms a vapor cloud which upon ignition burns as a flash fire. 
ii) A continuous release (CR) of propane gas at 10 kg/ s due to a leak in a 
storage tank. The cloud formed due to this release, upon ignition results in 
a flash fire. 
As mentioned before, the radiation and fatality results are plotted as 
contours over an imaginary process area (100x100 m 2) of a typical offshore 
platform. 
Simulation Results 
Table 7.1. Flash fire simulation results 
SLAB dispersion Ignition model Radiation model 
model 
Type of 
Cloud Cloud Time for Flame Flame Maximum Cloud release Prob. of bum Radius Height Ignition Ignition height speed 
I q' 
time (m.) (m.) (s) (m.) (m./s) (kW /m.2) (s) 
Instantaneous 36.83 1.13 0.52 19 44.54 6 42.50 13 (1000 kg) 
Continuous 33.60 1.47 0.76 33 24.14 6 32.91 8 (10 Kgls) 
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Radiation Effects: 
The gas that is released (instantaneously or continuously) forms a cloud 
and disperses with initial momentum in low wind conditions. The dispersion of 
these clouds was simulated using a SLAB dispersion model to estimate the 
dimension of the cloud. Probability of ignition (P) was estimated using an onsite 
ignition model when the cloud concentration is within the flammability limits. 
The variations of P and cloud size with time, as well as P and cloud 
concentration with time, were plotted for the IR scenario in Figures 7.7 and 7.8 
respectively. It is clear from the figures that an increase in the cloud size with 
time would lead to an increase in P and decrease in cloud concentration. 
The results obtained from the SLAB model (cloud radius, height), and the 
ignition model (P, time of ignition after release) were used in the Flash Fire 
radiation model to obtain the fire dimensions and characteristics. These results 
are presented in Table 7.1 for both IR/CR scenarios. Further, radiation contours 
and fatality contours were plotted over the process area and are represented in 
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 for IR and in Figures 7.11 and 7.12 for CR. Radiation and 
fatality contours from theIR scenario show that most of the plant area is affected, 
whereas the contours from the CR scenario show that a relatively small part of 
the plant is affected. With this we can conclude that flash fire from an IRis the 
more dangerous event. However, the effects of escalation events (e.g. pool fire, 
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jet fire, BLEVE, VCE etc) that result when the cloud burns back during a CR, are 
likely to be more severe than the flash fire itself. 
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Radiation Contours 
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Figure 7.9. Radiation contours for the instantaneous propane release flash fire 
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7.2. OFFSHORE EXPLOSIONS: CREDIBLE SCENARIOS 
In this section, various credible scenarios for gas explosions and BLEVE 
are identified. Among gas explosions emphasis is given to only partially 
confined vapor cloud explosion, confined vapor cloud explosion and external 
explosion. The scenarios identified are simulated using the suite of models 
mentioned in chapter 2 for explosion consequence analysis, in a sequential order. 
The results are presented graphically in two different ways: overpressure decay 
contours and overpressure damage (0/o fatality) contours plotted over an 
imaginary (lOOxlOO m 2) process area. 
Scenario 1: Partially Confined vapor cloud explosion 
A 1000 kg of Propane gas released into a process area that is highly 
congested and partially confined, results in a vapor cloud explosion upon 
ignition. The simulation was carried out using Congestion Assessment Method. 
Congestion in the process area is characterized by the blockage caused by 
process equipment in the length, breadth and height dimensions of the process 
area, usually referred as blockage ratio. Input values of 0.3 along the length 
dimension, 0.4 along the breadth dimension and 0.2 along the height dimension 
have been considered in this scenario. 
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Simulation Results: 
T bl 7 2 C a e . . onges1on ssessmen tM th d . 1 t• lt e 0 s1mu a Ion resu s 
SLAB dispersion Ignition model CAM2 explosion model 
model 
Cloud Cloud Prob. of Time for Source Source Source Ignition Volume Radius Pressure Radius (m) Height (m) Ignition (s) (m3) (m) (bar) 
36.83 1.13 0.503 19 37392 26.14 7.73 
The simulation procedure is similar to that used for flash fires discussed in 
section 7.1 except that here, the results obtained from the SLAB and ignition 
models were used as input to the CAM2 explosion model to estimate the source 
overpressure, and then an overpressure decay model was used to obtain the blast 
waves. The results from the simulation are presented in Table 7.2, and the decay 
of the source pressure is plotted as contours over the process area in Figure 7.13. 
It is evident from the results (Figure 7.13) that the lethal overpressure engulfs the 
complete process area. The impact to human beings due to the blast waves is 
represented as fatality contours in Figure 7.14. Contours engulfing the entire 
process area further support the earlier prediction. 
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Scenario 2: Confined vapor cloud explosion 
An offshore module (lOx 5x 5m3) is completely filled with a stoichiometric 
amount of propane gas. The presence of obstacles at distances 1, 2, 4, 7 and 9 
meters (see Figure 7.15) from one end of the wall, causes the gases to burn 
rapidly leading to a confined vapor cloud explosion. This particular scenario was 
simulated using SCOPE 3 and the results are shown in Table 7.3. The results in 
the table show how the turbulence intensity, drag coefficient, flame speed and 
overpressure vary after passing over each grid of obstacles. Turbulence, flame 
speed, and overpressure increase as the unburned gases pass over obstacles, 
which are reflected in the tabulated results. Precisely, the profile of variation of 
overpressure with time is shown in Figure 7.16, which shows that the gas in a 
10x5x5 m 3 volume is burnt in just 0.13 seconds leading to the development of 
high pressure. However it was found that only 28°/o of the gas was burned inside 
the module while the rest was vented out and combusted as an external 
explosion. Also, the variation of overpressure with flame position in the module 
is shown in Figure 6.17. The overpressure due to the gas burned in the module 
was 4.14 bar, whereas from the gas vented out was 2.04 bar. Thus the 
approximate maximum source overpressure generated by the combination of 
confined and vented explosion (Pmax = Pmodule + 0.7Pvented) is 5.56 bar. 
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Table 7.3. SCOPE 3 simulation results 
Grid 
number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Grid 
position 
(m) 
1 
2 
4 
7 
9 
10 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
5m: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Turbulence Drag intensity 
(m/s) coefficient 
0.64 4.09 
1.10 4.08 
3.12 4.08 
7.47 3.98 
11.24 3.48 
13.84 3.08 
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Flame 
u"• Overpressure Reynolds 
speed 
(m/s) (m/s) (bar) number 
1.16 0 0.02 74 
7.94 0.23 0.04 159 
44.87 1.62 0.51 1105 
107.61 9.21 1.03 6277 
161.85 23.37 1.97 15918 
199.25 38.19 4.14 26019 
~-----------------------!~-~-----------------------~ 
Figure 7.15. Geometry of an offshore module with a vent and obstacles at 1,2,4,7 
and 9 meters 
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Scenario 3: BLEVE followed by a fireball in an oil separator 
High-pressure development in the 25 m 3 separator due to external fire 
impingement causes the unit to fail as a BLEVE. The vapor cloud formed due to 
BLEVE on ignition causes a fireball. 
Simulation Results: 
Maximum overpressure = 1.2 bar 
Diameter of fireball = 66 m 
Time of existence of fireball = 7.9 s 
Height of fireball center above ground= 49.5 m 
Surface emissive power from the fireball= 320 kW /m2 
The simulation results are represented as blast waves obtained from 
BLEVE and as radiation contours from the resulting fireball, shown in Figures 
7.18 and 7.19 respectively. It is clear from the figures that the effect of BLEVE is 
concentrated in the near field, whereas the fireball radiation is widespread over 
most of the process area. The impact to human beings (0/ofatality) due to the 
cumulative effect of overpressure and heat load is then represented in Figure 
7.20. It was found that the impact due to the fireball is greater than the blast 
waves and encompasses the entire process area. 
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Figure 7.18. Blast waves from a BLEVE in oil separator. 
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Figure 7.19. Radiation contours from a fireball 
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Fatality contours for BLEVE-fireball scenario o/o fatality 
100 
90 
80 
70 
5 60 
Q) 
(.) 
50 c: (1J 
t) 
0 40 
30 
20 
10 
20 40 60 80 100 
Distance (m) 
Figure 7.20. Lethality (overpressure & radiation) contours from a BLEVE-
fireball scenario 
7.3. MISSILE IMPACT SCENARIO 
In this section, a scenario has been considered to illustrate the capability of 
the newly developed probabilistic model for assessing the missile impacts, the 
methodology being discussed earlier in section 5.3. 
Scenario: A 25 m3 cylindrical propane storage vessel is placed horizontally on the 
ground. It is filled with 80°/o liquid propane. Due to engulfment of the vessel in 
fire, it bursts as a BLEVE. Fragments generated as a result of the explosion from 
the vessel turn into missiles and pose danger to the equipment in its vicinity. 
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Consider a spherical storage tank, 15 m diameter, 150 m away from the 
exploding vessel, oriented at angle of 30°. It is intended to find the probability of 
strike of missiles at this spherical target object. Upon simulating this scenario, the 
following results were obtained. 
Simulation results: 
BLEVE explosion energy= 7.14e4 KJoules. 
Effective Range Interval (ERI) = 22.5 m 
Effective Orientation Interval (EOI) = 8.58 degrees 
Effective Trajectory Interval (ETI) = 7.125 degrees 
The probability density function and the cumulative distribution function 
obtained for the range of fragments as a result of Monte-Carlo simulation are 
shown in Figures 7.21 and 7.22 respectively. 
Histogram (or the range of Miaa1les 
woo.-~--~--~--~--~--~--. 
5IJO 
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Rango (m) 
Figure 7.21. Probability density 
function for Range of missiles 
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The probability of strike results follows: 
Probability of strike due to fragments falling within the vulnerable area: 
The probability of fragments falling within the ERI = 0.0428 
The probability of fragments orienting within the EOI 
The probability of strike from this scenario 
= 0.0209 
= 8.9356e-004 
Probability of strike due to collision of fragments with the target before 
reaching their final destination: 
The probability of fragments falling beyond the ERI 
The probability of fragments orienting within the EOI 
The probability of fragments flying within the ETI 
The probability of strike from this scenario 
Overall probability of missile strike 
= 0.6935 
= 0.0209 
= 0.3937 
= 0.0057 
= 0.00089+0.0057 
= 0.0066 
To provide a more interactive representation of the results, a multipoint 
grid based approach (Pula et.al., 2004) was used along with the probabilistic 
approach proposed here. The probability of strike results evaluated at various 
points in a defined area were obtained as a two dimensional matrix which was 
subsequently plotted as contours as shown in Figure 7.23. It is clear from the 
figure that for cylinders horizontally placed on the ground; the probability of 
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missile strike is much higher in the axial directions than in any other directions. 
This is close to reality because of the fact that the fragments such as end caps 
generated from the rupture of horizontal cylinders fall in the axial directions. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that symmetry of probability of strike around the 
object, as was obtained in (Hauptmmans, 2001) is incorrect for horizontal 
cylinders as explosion source. There may be that this symmetry holds true for 
spherical and vertical cylinders, however it needs to be justified. 
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Figure 7.23. Probability of missile strike contours 
These calculations can be further combined with the consequence 
calculations to obtain missile risk contours, which can then be used in designs of 
safer process layouts. 
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7.4. COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITH OTHER PACKAGES 
In this section, the results from the pool fire and jet fire consequence 
models discussed in section 6.1., scenarios 1 and 2, are compared with their 
corresponding point source models (such as used in the commercial software 
PLATO©, a well-known package for simulating hydrocarbon leakage and 
ignition on offshore installations). A description of the modeling approaches for 
pool fires, jet fires and fireballs that are embedded in this package is given by 
Jones & Irvine (1997). These pool fire and jet fire point source models were 
simulated for the same data and specifications as in scenarios 1 and 2 in section 
7.1. The results are represented as radiation contours and radiation damage 
contours in Figures 7.24- 7.27. 
Scenario 1: Pool fire results comparison 
Comparing the results of the pool fire consequence model as shown in 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 with those in Figures 7.24 and 7.25 indicates that: 
• 
• 
The radiation contours from the point source model (used in PLATO©) are 
circular, whereas the revised model gives elongated contours due to the 
actual physical mechanism of flame tilt. 
The point source model (used in PLATO©) over-predicts the thermal 
radiation damage relative to the revised pool fire model used in the 
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present approach. This is to be expected given the point source approach 
in the former model and the use of a solid flame in the latter. Hence the 
use of point source models brings in a large amount of uncertainty in the 
results. 
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Figure 7.24. Radiation contours from point source pool fire consequence model 
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Figure 7.25. Percentage lethality (thermal radiation) contours from point source 
pool fire consequence model. 
Scenario 2: Jet fire results comparison 
Comparing the results of the jet fire consequence model as shown in 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 with those in Figures 7.26 and 7.27 indicates that: 
• The radiation contours predicted by the revised model are elliptical in 
shape, whereas those from the point source model are concentric circles. 
• The damage contours display the same features as the radiation contours 
described in the previous point. 
• The over-predictions as a result of using a point source model are clear 
from the damage contour plots. 
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Although the comparisons above are admittedly limited, it is felt that the 
ability of the pool fire and jet fire consequence models adopted here to simulate 
aspects of physical behavior has been demonstrated. These aspects include pool 
fire flame tilt due to the prevailing wind direction and the elliptical shape of a 
horizontal jet fire due to the momentum impulse created in such a scenario. In 
addition to radiation impact consequences, the overpressure impact caused by 
hot expanding combustion gases and unburned fuel gases was also considered 
by the consequence models employed in the current work. 
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Figure 7.26. Radiation contours from point source jet fire consequence model. 
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Figure 7.27. Percentage lethality (thermal radiation) contours from point source 
jet fire consequence model. 
7.5. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the results obtained by simulation of a variety of scenarios 
for all the types of fires and explosions discussed in the work have been 
discussed. Consequences from these accidents were plotted as percentage fatality 
contours over the imaginary process area of a typical offshore platform. These 
contours provide an ability to develop a clear picture of potential impact zones 
and the safer zones. This can facilitate proper selection and specification of safe 
separation distances to prevent injury to people and damage to nearby 
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equipment. A limited comparison of these results with those obtained from 
models used in commercial software packages has also been made. The 
comparison justified the accurate predictions of the realistic radiation and 
damage contours using the models used in this approach. The results obtained 
from the probabilistic model developed to predict the probability of missile 
impact on a target object were also discussed. The probability of missile strike 
contours from uBLEVE in a horizontal cylinder" scenario has proved to be close 
to reality as well. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1. CONCLUSIONS 
This work has been mainly focused on developing a computer automated 
toolkit that can assist the execution of consequence analysis of process related 
accidents such as fires and explosions, which commonly occur on offshore 
platforms. A methodology has been proposed for offshore consequence analysis 
and computer codes were subsequently developed using the proposed 
methodology and the consequence models discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. The 
following revisions were incorporated in the present methodology and 
consequence models in comparison with those used in available software 
packages: 
• An enhanced onsite ignition model was used in the current study. 
• The state-of-the-art fire and explosion consequence models were 
employed that closely match the physical characteristics of fire scenarios 
which arise on offshore installations. 
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A fire overpressure model was employed to investigate the possibility of 
blast effects from fires occurring in confined offshore modules. 
• A new probabilistic model was developed and used to characterize the 
effects of missiles on the escalation of accidents. 
• A grid-based approach was adopted to enable better modeling and 
analysis of radiation and overpressure impact. 
To illustrate the capability of the computer codes, a variety of credible 
accident scenarios was considered. The simulation results obtained from these 
scenarios were presented as hazard and damage contours by using the proposed 
grid based approach. These damage contours permit the development of a clear 
picture of potential impact zones over the process area. This can facilitate proper 
selection and specification of safe separation distances to prevent injury to 
people and damage to nearby equipment. This can also help in the design of 
protective layers (barriers between accident and receptors) and effective 
emergency response plans. 
Overpressure generation from fires has also been shown to be a critical 
consideration in developing the impact zone map for an offshore facility. Also, 
missile impact analysis is found to be crucial in devising protective measures 
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against missiles and in designing the layout of the process area such that missile 
impact on the nearby equipment or the surrounding of its premises becomes 
improbable. 
Finally, this work highlights the implementation of a grid based 
approach for offshore fire and explosion consequence analysis, which is found to 
be effective for contour plotting and analyzing the results in a better way. The 
kind of analysis carried out in this work can be used to predict the consequences 
from the hazardous events on offshore platforms. 
8.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
i) Comparison and validation of results: In order to make the consequence 
models more reliable and the computer codes competitive with the 
existing ones it is necessary that the simulation results be properly 
compared and validated with the experimental results from large scale 
studies. Therefore, the first recommendation is to compare and validate 
the simulation results with the experimental results. 
ii) Sensitivity analysis: Most of the inputs and the outputs from 
consequence studies are uncertain to some degree. In some cases, the 
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uncertainties may be very large, and the conclusions of the overall QRA 
may be sensitive to possible variations in the inputs or modeling 
assumptions. These uncertainties form one of the main limitations and it 
is important that they are understood and accounted for explicitly. 
Therefore, sensitivity analysis is one of the future directions for 
improvement of the current work. 
iii) Development of a user friendly software using Visual Basic: Finally, a 
user friendly software package needs to be developed in Visual Basic 
making use of the computer codes developed during this work. This 
package can be subsequently combined with the supporting software 
packages for hazard identification and frequency analysis to come up 
with a comprehensive offshore QRA toolkit. 
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Appendix A- Simulation code for Jet fire consequence 
evaluation 
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% Simulation of horizontal jet fire consequence evaluation 
clear all; 
global density _air g G Ds W; 
% momemtum flux G calculation 
0/o********************************************* 
Ts = 277; 
gama_gas = 1.31; 
Mdot = 11.2; 
do= 0.152; 
Wgk = 16.9*10"-3; %kg molecular weight of gas kg/mole (16.9 kg/kgmol) 
density_gas_STP = 1.819; 
Rc = 8.314; %J.K/mol 
Po= 101.3*10"3; % N/m2 
0/o********************************************** 
% flame geometry variables 
0/o*********************************************** 
density _air = 1.25; 
g = 9.8; 
w = 0.05; 
Ua =5; 
Wa=O; 
0/o************************************************* 
%ATMOSPHERIC TRANSMISSIVITY 
0/o************************************************** 
% RH =fractional relative humidity range(0-1) 
% Smm = Saturated water vapor pressure in mm of Hg at the atmospheric temp T 
% L = path length (m) 
RH = 0.89; 
Smm = 760; 
T = 279; 
Qc = 589822.48;% heat of combustion for methane is 890 Kj/gmol.. 
% Qc =He* Mdot/Mwt = 890*11.2/16.9e-3 
0/o***************************************************** 
% thermal radiation variables 
0/o************************************************* 
k =0.4;% constant grey gas absorption coefficient m-1 
0/o*************************************************** 
% CALCULATION OF MOMENTUM FLUX G 
% calculation of Mach no for unchoked flow 
%F = 3.6233*10"-5 * (Mdot/do"2) * sqrt( Ts/(gama_gas*Wgk) ); 
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%Mach_jet = sqrt( (sqrt( 1+2*(gama_gas -1)*F"2) -1) I (gama_gas -1)) 
% Calculation of Temperature of the jet 
% T_jet = ( 2 * Ts )I( 2 + (gama_gas -1) * Mach_jet"2 ); 
% Density of the expanded jet 
% density _jet = density _gas_STP * 273 IT _jet; 
% velocity of the jet 
% U_jet = Mach_jet * sqrt( (gama_gas*Rc*T_jet)IWgk) 
% diameter of the expanded jet 
% D_jet = sqrt( (4*Mdot)l(pi*U_jet*density_jet) ); 
%momentum flux G 
% G = ( pi * density _jet * U _jet"2 * D _jet"2) I 4 
% Ds =do* sqrt(density_jetldensity_air) 
% Calculation of Mach no for choked flow 
Tc = (2*Ts)l(1+gama_gas) 
Pc = 3.6713 * (Mdotldo"2) * sqrt( Tcl(gama_gas*Wgk)) 
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Mach_jet = sqrt( ((gama_gas+1)*(PciPo)"((gama_gas-1)1gama_gas)- 2) I (gama_gas-1)) 
% Calculation of Temperature of the jet 
T_jet = ( 2 * Ts )I( 2 + (gama_gas -1) * Mach_jet"2) 
%Density of the expanded jet 
density_jet = density_gas_STP * 273IT_jet; 
%velocity of jet 
U_jet = Mach_jet * sqrt( (gama_gas*Rc*T_jet)IWgk) 
%diameter of the expanded jet 
D_jet = sqrt( (4*Mdot)l(pi*U_jet*density_jet) ); 
% momentum flux G 
G = (pi* density_jet * U_jet"2 * D_jet"2)14 
Ds = D_jet * sqrt(density_jetldensity_air); 
% FLAME GOEMETRY 
% calculation of flame length in still air 
%options= optimset('Display','iter','To1Fun',1e-5) 
Lbo = fzero('calcLbo',[0.01100])%,options) 
GITA = ((pi*density_air*g)I(4*G))"(113) * Lbo 
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OHMx = sqrt(pi*density_air/(4*G))*Lbo*Ua 
OHMz = sqrt(pi*density_air/(4*G))*Lbo*Wa 
(m/sec) 
% Ua =wind speed in release direction (m/sec) 
% Wa = wind speed perpendicular to release 
if(GITA <= 5.11) 
F _GITA = 0.55 + (1-0.55) * exp(-0.168*GITA); 
elseif(GITA>5.11) 
F _GITA = 0.55 + (1-0.55) * exp(-0.168*GITA- 0.3*(GITA-5.11)"2); 
end 
if(GITA <= 3) 
r_GITA = 0; 
elseif(GITA>3) 
r_GITA = 0.082*( 1-exp( -O.S*(GITA-3.3)) ); 
end 
% X position of the flame 
X= Lbo * F_GITA *(1+ r_GITA * OHMx) 
if(X>Lbo) 
X= Lbo; 
end 
% limit placed on the X position by setting a max value of X/Lbo = 1 
h_GITA = (1 + (1/GITA))"-8.78 
c_GITA = 0.02*GITA 
% Y position of the flame 
Y = Lbo * h_GITA * (1-c_GITA*OHMx) 
Lbxy = sqrt(X"2 + Y"2) 
% maximum width of the flame 
W2 = Lbxy * ( -0.004 + 0.0396*GITA- OHMx*(0.0094 + 9.5*10"-7*GITA"5)) 
% Flame lift off 
b = 0.141 * sqrt(G*density_air) 
% Minimum width of the flame 
W1 = b*(-0.18 + 0.081*GITA) 
% flame cannot become narrower than the forced convection limit and 
%therefore W1/b has a minimum value of 0.12 
if( W1/b < 0.12) 
W1 = 0.12*b 
end 
% Z position of the flame 
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Z = (X-b)*0.178*0HMz 
Lbxz = sqrt(X"2 + Z"2); 
%Lbxy = sqrt(Lbxz"2 + Y "2) 
%calculation of angle of tilt with the vertical and the horizontal 
theta_v = 90- asin(Y /Lbxy)*180/pi 
theta_h = asin(Z/Lbxz)*180/pi 
% Room dimensions and grids 
Appendix A 
0/o*********************************************************************************************************** 
coverage_distance = 100; %room area 
% for radiation heat flux calculations, evaluation at each meter 
if( coverage_distance>=50) 
n=51; % maximum number of grid for calcualtions .. just to reduce the execution time 
else 
n = coverage_distance/1 + 1;% n meters= n+1 grids are required 
end 
0/o*********************************************************************************************************** 
%ATMOSPHERIC TRANSMISSIVITY 
0/o*********************************************************************************************************** 
L_distance = relative_distance(coverage_distance,n,X); 
for i=1:n 
for j=1:n 
if(L_distance(i,j) == 0) 
Tou(i,j) = 1; 
else 
X_H20(i,j) = RH * L_distance(i,j) * Smm * 2.88651 *10"2 I T; 
X_C02(i,j) = L_distance(i,j) * 273/T; 
Tou(i,j) = 1.006-0.01171 * log10(X_H20(i,j))- 0.02368 * log10(X_H20(i,j))"2-
0.03188*log10(X_C02(i,j)) + 0.001164*log10(X_C02(i,j))"2; 
end 
end 
end 
0/o********************************************************************************************************* 
for i=1:n 
for j=1:n 
if(Tou(i,j)<O) 
Tou(i,j)=1; 
end 
end 
end 
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% View factor calculation 
%De= 2*sqrt(Wl+W2)/Lbxy * ( Lbxy"'2 + (W2-Wl) )"'(1/3) 
De= (Wl+W2)/2; 
VF = viewfactor(theta_ v,De,Lbxy,X,coverage_distance,n) ; 
VFend =VF; 
VFside = VF; 
% surface emissive power 
Fso = 0.21 *exp(-0.00323*U_jet)+ 0.14; 
RL = sqrt( (X-b )"'2 + Y "'2 ) ; 
A= pi/4 * (W1"'2 + W2"'2) + pi/2 * (Wl+W2) * sqrt( RL"'2 + (W2-Wl/2)"'2 ); 
So= Qc*Fso/ A; 
Sside = So*(l-exp( -k*W2)) ; 
Send= So*(l-exp(-k*RL)); 
%Q = (Sside+Send).*VF .*Tou; 
Q = (VFend*Send + VFside*Sside) .* Tou; 
x = l:n; 
y = x; 
[X,Y] = meshgrid(x,y); 
Z = Q(x,y);%peaks(X,Y); 
pcolor(X, Y ,Z); 
shading interp; 
hold on; 
contour(X, Y ,Z) ;% , 'k '); 
colorbar; 
RELATIVE DISTANCE ROUTINE 
function L = relative_distance(coverage_distance,n,flame_length); 
%coverage_distance = 250; 
%flame_length = 87.3; 
%n=ll;% no of grid points ... usually lOrn= 11 grids, distance b/w 2 grids= lm 
m = ceil(n/2); 
k = 2*m-1;% to make a (m,2*m) matrix 
X= zeros(m,k); 
% first making a small compartment and then extending it 
Appendix A 
X(l,l) = coverage_distance/2;% right top compartment... 125 if coveragedist =250m 
X(m,k) = coverage_distance; % right top compartment ... 0-250 ... 
X(m,l) = 0; 
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% initializing the boundaries 
horizontal_increment = (X(m,k)-0) I (k-1); 
for i=2:k 
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X(m,i) = X(m,i-1) + horizontal_increment;% filling the gaps between 0-250 depending on the 
no. of grids 
end 
vertical_increment = ( X(1,1)- 0)/(m-1); 
for i=2:m 
X(i,1) = X(i-1,1)- vertical_increment;% filling the gaps between 125-0 
end 
for i=1:m 
for j=2:k 
X(i,j) = sqrt( X(i,1)"2 + X(m,j)"2 ); 
end 
end 
Y = X(1:m-1,:); 
Y=flipud(Y); 
X= [X;Y]; %Matrix which gives the relative distance from the location of fire 
temp= coverage_distance- ceil(flame_length);% temporary variable for diff b/w room length 
and fire length. 
if(temp <=0) 
XX = zeros(m,k); 
XX(1,1) = coverage_distance/2; 
vertical_increment = ( XX(1,1)- 0)/(m-1); 
for i=2:m 
XX(i,1) = XX(i-1,1)- vertical_increment;% filling the gaps between 125-0 for first column 
end 
for i=2:k 
XX(:,i) = XX(:,1); %copying to all other columns 
end 
YY = XX(1:m-1,:); 
YY = flipud(YY); 
X= [XX;YY]; 
L =X; 
else 
FL_grids = ceil(flame_length/horizontal_increment)+ 1; %grids occupied by flame starting 
fromO 
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Remaining_grids = n - FL_grids ; 
X_copy = X(:,2:Remaining_grids+1); 
XX= zeros(m,FL_grids); 
XX(1,1) = coverage_distance/2; 
vertical_increment = ( XX(1,1)- 0)/(m-1); 
for i=2:m 
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XX(i,1) = XX(i-1,1)- vertical_increment;% filling the gaps between 125-0 for first column 
end 
for i=2:FL_grids 
XX(:,i) = XX(:,1); %copying to all other columns 
end 
YY = XX(1:m-1,:); 
YY = flipud(YY); 
XX = [XX; YY]; 
X = [XX X_ copy]; 
L=X; 
end 
VIEWFACTOR CALCULATION ROUTINE 
% Viewfactor calculation at various grid points 
function VF _target90 = viewfactor(theta,D,Len,flame_length,coverage_distance,n); 
global L X_func theta_func 
0/o*********************************************************************** 
% CALCULATION OF RELATIVE DISTANCES 
0/o*********************************************************************** 
m = ceil(n/2); 
k = 2*m-1; % to make a (m,2*m) matrix 
X = zeros(m,k) ; 
% first making a small compartment and then extending it 
X(1,1) = coverage_distance/2;% right top compartment .. . 
X(m,k) = coverage_distance; % right top compartment .. . 
X(m,1) = 0; 
%initializing the boundaries 
horizontal_increment = (X(m,k)-0)/(k-1); 
for i=2:k 
125 
0-250 ... 
if coveragedist = 250m 
X(m,i) = X(m,i-1) + horizontal_increment;% filling the gaps between 0-250 depending on the 
no. of grids 
end 
170 
vertical_increment = ( X(1,1)- 0)/(m-1); 
for i=2:m 
X(i,1) = X(i-1,1)- vertical_increment;% filling the gaps between 125-0 
end 
for i=1:m 
for j=2:k 
X(i,j) = sqrt( X(i,1)"2 + X(m,j)"2 ); 
end 
end 
Y = X(1:m-1,:); 
Y=flipud(Y); 
X= [X;Y]; %Matrix which gives the relative distance from the location of fire 
Appendix A 
temp= coverage_distance- ceil(flame_length);% temporary variable for diff b/w room length 
and fire length. 
if(temp <=0) 
XX= zeros(m,k); 
XX(1,1) = coverage_distance/2; 
vertical_increment = ( XX(1,1)- 0)/(m-1); 
for i=2:m 
XX(i,1) = XX(i-1,1)- vertical_increment;% filling the gaps between 125-0 for first column 
end 
for i=2:k 
XX(:,i) = XX(:,1); %copying to all other columns 
end 
YY = XX(1:m-1,:); 
YY = flipud(YY); 
X= [XX;YY]; 
Xdup =X; 
else 
FL_grids = ceil(flame_length/horizontal_increment)+ 1; %grids occupied by flame starting 
fromO 
Remaining_grids = n - FL_grids ; 
X_copy = X(:,2:Remaining_grids+1); 
XX= zeros(m,FL_grids); 
XX(1,1) = coverage_distance/2; 
vertical_increment = ( XX(1,1)- 0)/(m-1); 
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for i=2:m 
XX(i,1) = XX(i-1,1)- vertical_increment;% filling the gaps between 125-0 for first column 
end 
for i=2:FL_grids 
XX(:,i) = XX(:,1); %copying to all other columns 
end 
YY = XX(1:m-1,:); 
YY = flipud(YY); 
XX = [XX; YY]; 
X = [XX X_ copy]; 
Xdup =X; 
end 
0/o************************************************************************** 
%CALCULATION OF ANGLE OF TILT AT DIFFERENT GRIDS 
0/o*********************************************************************** 
Theta= zeros(m,k); 
theta= 72; 
for i=1:m 
for j=1:k 
if(i==1 & j==1) 
Theta(i,j) = theta ; 
else 
Theta(i,j) = acot((i-1)/(j-1)); 
Theta(i,j) = Theta(i,j)*180 I pi; 
Theta(i,j) = (theta/90)*Theta(i,j); 
end 
end 
end 
Theta; 
temp= Theta(2:m,:); 
temp= flipud(temp); 
Theta= [temp;Theta]; 
0/o************************************************************************** 
r = D/2; 
1 =Len; 
Theta= Theta*pi/180; 
L = 1/r; 
X= X./r; 
Phi= asin(l./X); 
b1 = sqrt( (X."2- 1).*cos(Theta)."2 + (1- l./X."2).*sin(Theta)."2 ); 
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a1 = (atan( (L- ((X-1)./X).*sin(Theta))./b1) + atan( (((X-1)./X).*sin(Theta))./b1) ).*(l./b1); 
%for i=1:n 
% for j=1:n 
% a2(i,j) = integraleval(X(i,j),theta(i,j)); 
% a3(i,j) = integraleval3(X(i,j),theta(i,j)); 
% a4(i,j) = integraleval4(X(i,j),theta(i,j)); 
%end 
%end 
for i=1:n 
for j=1:n 
X_func = X(i,j); 
theta_func = Theta(i,j); 
a2(i,j) = quadl('fintegral',O,pi/2); 
a3(i,j) = quadl('fA3integral',O,pi/2) ; 
a4(i,j) = quadl('fA4integral',O,pi/2); 
% a2(i,j) = integraleval(X(i,j),theta(i,j)); 
%a3(i,j) = integraleval3(X(i,j),theta(i,j)); 
%a4(i,j) = integraleval4(X(i,j),theta(i,j)); 
end 
end 
a2; 
a3(floor(n/2),floor(n/2)+2); 
%VF _target90 = (1/pi) * cos(theta).*( al.*cos(Phi) + L.*a2 ); 
VF _target90 = (1/pi) *( sin(Theta) .* ( al.*cos(Phi) + L.*a2) + (a3-a4) ); 
for i=1:n 
for j=1:n 
if(Xdup(i,j)<=r) 
VF _target90(i,j) = 0.7; 
end 
end 
end 
VF _target90 = abs(VF _target90); 
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